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Pension Plans: Independent Valuation And Hedge Fund Risk Control

Saturday, June 30th, 2007

Independent Valuation And Hedge Fund Risk Control

June 26 2007

West Palm Beach (HedgeCo.Net)- Recent financial statistics have shown that pension plans are beginning to out-pace high net individuals with respect to hedge fund investing. At the same time, sub-prime funds struggle in the aftermath of blow-ups such as Amaranth and Bayou.

According to Dr. Susan M. Mangiero, CFA, Accredited Valuation Analyst and certified Financial Risk Manager, “Pension fiduciaries are on the hook for making sure that they have done everything possible to avoid a hedge fund meltdown. We want to help plan sponsors before trouble starts. Issues such as independent valuations and good risk controls are essential but that is just the tip of the iceberg.”

In an effort to assist plan sponsors in this area, Pension Governance is presenting the Hedge Fund Toolbox series today, (June 26th) and later this week (June 28). The discussion covers the role of the pension consultant and proper valuation policies and procedures.

The Hedge Fund Toolbox is a series of six webinars that focus on hedge fund economics, operations and legal considerations. These two events are hosted by Pension Governance as a way to shed light on a sometimes mysterious corner of the investment world.

Pension Governance is an independent research and analysis company that focuses on benefit plan investment risk, corporate strategy, valuation and accounting issues, with the fiduciary perspective in mind. The company is sponsored by HedgeCo.Net, Albourne Village, Lipper Hedge World and the National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts.

Alex Akesson

Contributing Writer
HedgeCo.Net
Email: Editor@hedgeco.net

URL

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Hedge Fund Conferences

Saturday, June 30th, 2007

 http://www.hedgeco.net/seminars/seminars.php

Place: Date: Time: Location: URL: Sign Up:

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Saturday, June 30th, 2007

Weekend Edition
June 30 / July 1, 2007

A Subprime Chernobyl?

The Fed’s Role in the Bear Stearns Meltdown

By MIKE WHITNEY

The Bank for International Settlements issued a warning last week that the Federal Reserve’s monetary policies have created an enormous equity bubble which could lead to another “Great Depression”. The UK Telegraph says that, “The BIS–the ultimate bank of central bankers–pointed to a confluence a worrying signs, citing mass issuance of new-fangled credit instruments, soaring levels of household debt, extreme appetite for risk shown by investors, and entrenched imbalances in the world currency system.”

The IMF and the UN have issued similar warnings, but they’ve all been ignored by the Bush administration. Neither Bush nor the Federal Reserve is interested in “course correction”. They plan to stick with the same harebrained policies until the end.

The “easy credit” which created the subprime crisis in mortgage lending has now spread to the hedge fund industry. The troubles at Bear Stearns prove that Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson’s assurance that the problem is “contained” is pure baloney. The contagion is swiftly moving through the entire system taking down home owners, mortgage lenders, banks, rating agencies, and hedge funds. We are just at the beginning of a system-wide breakdown.

The problem originated at the Federal Reserve when Fed-chief Alan Greenspan lowered the Feds Fund Rate to 1% in June 2003 and kept rates perilously low for more than 2 years. Trillions of dollars flowed into the economy through low interest loans creating a massive equity bubble in real estate which drove up housing prices and triggered a speculative frenzy.

The Feds’ “easy money” policy has disrupted the “debt-to-GDP” balance which maintains the integrity of the currency. By expanding circulation debt via low interest rates; Greenspan put the country on the path to hyperinflation and, very likely, the collapse of the monetary system.

The problems at Bear Stearns are the logical upshot of Greenspan’s policies. The over-leveraged hedge funds are a good example of what happens during a “credit boom”. Liquidity flows into the markets and raises the nominal value of all asset classes but, at the same time, GDP continues to shrink. That’s because the wages of working class people have stagnated and not kept pace with productivity. When workers have less discretionary income, consumer spending”which accounts for 70% of GDP”begins to decline. That’s why this quarters earnings reports have fallen short of expectations. The American consumer is “tapped out”.

The current rise in stock prices does not indicate a healthy economy. It simply proves that the market is awash in cheap credit resulting from the Fed’s increases in the money supply. Consumer spending is a better indicator of the real state of the economy than stocks. When consumer spending drops off; it is a sign of overcapacity, which is deflationary. That means that growth will continue to shrivel because maxed-out workers can no longer purchase the things they are making.

The underlying problem is not simply the Fed’s reckless increases to the money supply, but the growing “wealth gap” which is undermining solid economic growth. If wages don’t keep pace with productivity; the middle class loses its ability to buy consumer items and the economy slows.

The reason that hasn’t happened yet in the US is because of the extraordinary opportunities to expand personal debt. The Fed’s low interest rates have created a culture of borrowing which has convinced many people that debt equals wealth. It’s not; and the collapse in the housing market will prove how lethal that theory really is.

To large extent, the housing bubble has concealed the systematic destruction of America’s industrial and manufacturing base. Low interest rates have lulled the public to sleep while millions of high-paying jobs have been outsourced. The rise in housing prices has created the illusion of prosperity but, in truth, we are only selling houses to each other and are not making anything that the rest of the world wants. The $11 trillion dollars that was pumped into the real estate market is probably the greatest waste of capital investment in the nations’ history. It hasn’t produced a single asset that will add to our collective wealth or industrial competitiveness. It’s been a total bust.

The Federal Reserve produces all the facts and figures related to the housing industry. They knew that trillions of dollars were being diverted into a speculative bubble, but they did nothing to stop it. Instead, they kept interest rates low and endorsed the lax lending standards which paved the way for millions of defaults. Now the effects of their “cheap money” policies have spread to the hedge fund industry where hundreds of billions of dollars in pensions and savings are in jeopardy.

Alan Greenspan played a major role in the housing boondoggle. On February 26, 2004, he said, “American consumers might benefit if lenders provide greater mortgage product alternatives to the traditional fixed rate mortgage. To the degree that households are driven by fears of payment shocks but willing to manage their own interest-rate risks, the traditional fixed-rate mortgage may be an expensive method of financing a home.”

Greenspan tacitly approved the whacky financing which produced all manner of untested loans”including ARMs, piggyback loans, “no doc” loans, “interest only” loans etc. These loans are a break from traditional financing and have contributed to the increase in bankruptcies.

Millions of people who were hoodwinked into buying homes with “interest-only”, “no down” loans will now either lose their homes or be shackled to an asset of decreasing value for the next 30 years. They’ve been tricked into a life of indentured servitude.

A recent article in the Wall Street Journal revealed the extent of Greenspan’s involvement in the housing fiasco. Here’s an excerpt from the article:

“Edward Gramlich, who was Fed governor from 1997 to 2005, said he proposed to Mr. Greenspan in or around 2000, when predatory lending was a growing concern, that the Fed use its discretionary authority to send examiners into the offices of consumer-finance lenders that were units of Fed-regulated bank holding companies.

“I would have liked the Fed to be a leader” in cracking down on predatory lending, Mr. Gramlich, now a scholar at the Urban Institute, said in an interview this past week. Knowing it would be controversial with Mr. Greenspan, whose deregulatory philosophy is well known, Mr. Gramlich broached it to him personally rather than take it to the full board.

“He was opposed to it, so I didn’t really pursue it,” says Mr. Gramlich.

“Still, Mr. Greenspan’s views did color the regulatory environment, facilitating growing concentration in banking and a hands-off approach to derivatives and hedge funds. That approach, broadly shared by both the Clinton and Bush administrations, is coming under increased scrutiny”. (Wall Street Journal)

So, Greenspan had the chance to “crack down on predatory lending” and he refused. Now millions of low income people are saddled with payments they have no reasonable prospect of paying off. How much of the present carnage could have been avoided if he had Greenspan done the right thing?

The “Not So Great” Depression

An article appeared this week in the UK Telegraph by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard which supports the theory that Greenspan’s “loose monetary policy” fueled a huge credit bubble, which is pushing the global economy towards a “1930s-style slump.”

The article quotes from a statement made by The Bank for International Settlements:

“Virtually nobody foresaw the Great Depression of the 1930s, or the crises which affected Japan and Southeast Asia in the early and late 1990s. In fact, each downturn was preceded by a period of non-inflationary growth exuberant enough to lead many commentators to suggest that a ‘new era’ had arrived”.

But today we face “worrying signs” of another economic meltdown.

The BIS said that they were “starting to doubt the wisdom of letting asset bubbles build up on the assumption that they could safely be cleaned up’ afterwards”. (Greenspan’s method) and that, “while cutting interest rates in such a crisis may help, it has the effect of transferring wealth from creditors to debtors and sowing the seeds for more serious problems further ahead.’”

“The bank said it was far from clear whether the US would be able to ignore the consequences of its latest imbalances, ($800 billion per year) citing a current account deficit running at 6.5% of GDP, a rise in US external liabilities by over $4 trillion from 2001 to 2005, and an unprecedented drop in the savings rate. The dollar clearly remains vulnerable to a sudden loss of private sector confidence.”‘

The BIS referred to the toxic effect of the “$470 billion in collateralized debt obligations (CDO), and a further $524 billion in “synthetic” CDOs which have spread through hedge funds industry. These CDOs are the loans (many sub primes) which were bundled off to Wall Street and turned into securities which are highly leveraged in hedge funds for maximum profitability. As Bear Stearns is discovering, these CDOs are like roadside bombs; exploding without notice whenever the stock market suddenly dips.

The BIS also cautioned about the excess of “leveraged buy-outs (mergers) which touched $753bn, with an average debt/cash flow ratio hitting a record 5.4–. Sooner or later the credit cycle will turn and default rates will begin to rise.’”

The central banks around the world are increasingly worried that the Bush administration’s profligate spending and irrational monetary policies will trigger a global depression. The recent volatility in the stock market suggests that the credit boom is just about over. Once the liquidity dries up—stocks will fall sharply.

The Housing Slump

Yesterday’s housing data, shows that sales are still weak while inventory continues to grow. Existing home sales dropped 3% while prices dropped another 2.1%. Falling prices mean that cash-strapped home owners will not be able to tap into their home’s equity for other expenses. Last year, mortgage equity withdrawals (MEWs) accounted for $600 billion of consumer spending. This year, the amount will be negligible at best.

The media and the Fed continue to mislead the public about the magnitude of the housing bubble. Fed chief Bernanke assures us that the sub prime calamity hasn’t “spread to other parts of the economy” (tell that to Bear Stearns) and the media keeps cheerily reiterating that a “turnaround” or “soft landing” is just ahead.

These claims are ridiculous. Apart from the 80 or more sub-prime lenders that have gone “belly-up” in the last few months, the rickety collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and mortgage backed securities (MBSs) are steamrolling their way through the stock market bowling down everything their path. Bear Stearns is just the first on the casualties list. There’ll be many more before the storm is over.

Fed-chairman Bernanke knows what’s going on. He was given a full rundown by “John Burns Real Estate Consulting that the national sales information for both new and existing homes, is “misleading and covering up a deep plunge of the housing sector.” The housing market is freefalling. Existing-home sales are down 22% in May and mortgage applications have fallen a whopping 18%….In Florida home sales are down 34%, not 28% as NAR reported; Arizona sales are down 38%, not 28%; and California’s down 37%, not 24% as NAR reports.”

Down 37% in California!?! It’s a landslide.

As the defaults continue to pile up; the hedge funds will take a bigger and bigger pounding. It can’t be avoided. That’s what happens when bankers abandon traditional lending standards and lend trillions of thousands of dollars to people who have bad credit and lie on their loan applications.

Thousands of these same shaky sub primes loans have been wrapped up like the Crown Jewels and sold off to Wall Street as CDOs. Now they are ripping through the hedge fund industry like a tornado in a trailer park. The media has tried to downplay the damage, but its not hard to see what is really going on. According to Reuters:

“Banks doubled the amount of CDOs outstanding in the past two years to $2.6 trillion, including a record $769 billion sold last year, according to J.P. Morgan. These figures include funded and unfunded issuance. Pimco’s Bill Gross said there are hundreds of billions of dollars of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), derivatives on subprime RMBS and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that buy subprime RMBS and/or the derivatives on the RMBS — all of which he considers “toxic waste.”‘

“$2.6 trillion”! That’s enough to bring down the whole economy. And, as Bear Stearns proves, the whole mess is beginning to unwind pretty quickly.

“Foreign investors have been the dominant buyers of these exotic debt instruments in recent years, owing to their insatiable demand for yield. If investors start dumping them, oh boy, watch out for some massive credit widening,” said Dan Fuss, Vice Chairman at Loomis Sayles. (Reuters)

If the hedge fund industry follows the downward slide of the housing bubble, foreign investors will run for the exits. In fact, this may already being happening.

China sold $5.8 billion in US Treasuries in May; the first time they have dumped USTs on the market. This may be the first sign of “capital flight”—foreign investment fleeing the US for more promising markets in Asia and Europe. The greenback’s survival now depends on the generosity of foreign bankers. If they refuse to recycle our $800 billion current account deficit by purchasing US bonds and securities, then the dollar will sink like a stone and lose its place as the world’s reserve currency.


More Housing Blowdown

Last Friday, the stock market took a 185-point nosedive on the news that Bear Stearns was trying to raise $3.2 billion to rescue its battered hedge fund. According to the New York Times, however, Bear was only able to came up with “$1.6 billion in secured loans to bail out one of the 2 hedge funds”.

The funds are the latest victim of the sub-prime meltdown which Bernanke and Paulson assured us was “largely contained”. In fact, Paulson even said, “We have had a major housing correction in this country,” and “I do believe we are at or near the bottom.”

Anyone who believes Paulson should take a look this chart It illustrates that how loan “resets” will continue to pound the housing market for at least another year and a half getting steadily worse as inventory grows.

The disaster is so bad that even the realtors are beginning to tell the truth. As one agent noted, “It’s a bloodbath.”

But the debacle in housing is only the first part of a much larger problem”a global liquidity crisis. Banks and mortgage lenders have already begun to tighten up their lending practices and many have abandoned sub prime loans altogether. (20% of the housing market in 2006 was sub prime) Now the focus has shifted to the stock market, where banks are beginning to see that “risk” has not been properly calculated. That means that if more hedge funds collapse, the banks may not be able to cover the losses.

The Bear Stearns fiasco has had a chilling affect on lending. In fact, the New York Times reported on 6-26-07 that “After years of supersize private equity deals–the buyout boom may be about to hit a bump–Rising interest rates and tougher terms from investors may signal that private equity players will soon be struggling to continue reaping the outsize returns that have made the buyout business so lucrative.” (Private Equity Investors Hint at Cool Down” NY Times)

Liquidity is drying up in the private equity business. The troubles at Bear Stearns has changed the credit-landscape overnight. Bankers are nervous, money is getting tighter, and liquidity is vanishing.

“We know that these holdings are not unique to Bear Stearns,” said Professor Joseph R. Mason, co-author of a recent study warning of dangers in securities backed by home loans to high-risk borrowers. “It would be hard to find a Wall Street firm that hasn’t created similar funds.”

That’s right; the industry is waist-deep in these sub-prime time-bombs. Shaky loans and rising foreclosures threaten to knock the foundation blocks out from under the stock market and set off a wave of panic selling.

Could it have been avoided?

Perhaps, if there were better regulations on rating bonds and restricting leverage.

Consider this: one of Bear Stearns hedge funds took a $600 million investment and leveraged it 10 times its value to $7 billion. Their portfolio was chock-full of dicey CDOs and “illiquid assets” such as timber holdings in foreign countries and toll roads. These assets are difficult to price and nearly impossible to quickly auction off if the market suddenly takes a downturn.

It looked like Merrill Lynch & Co., was going to auction off $850 million of Bear Stearns CDOs this week, but backed off at the last minute. (They were reportedly only offered 30 cents on the dollar!) Once the hedge funds start selling these CDOs, then everyone will know how little they’re worth. That could trigger a wave of selling that could bring down the stock market. Even if that scenario doesn’t play out, the Bear Stearns incident ensures that CDOs in other hedge funds will be face a substantial downgrading that could take a big chunk out of their bottom line.

And, there’s a bigger fear on Wall Street than the fact that 2 hedge funds are headed into bankruptcy, that is, that a sudden tightening of credit will send the over-leveraged stock market into a downward spiral.

The market is particularly sensitive to any rise in interest rates or tougher lending standards. It’s become addicted to cheap credit and any break in the chain will cause equities to plummet.

Economist Henry C K Liu sums it up like this:

“The liquidity boom has been delivering strong growth through asset inflation without adding commensurate substantive expansion of the real economy. –. Unlike real physical assets, virtual financial mirages that arise out of thin air can evaporate again into thin air without warning. As inflation picks up, the liquidity boom and asset inflation will draw to a close, leaving a hollowed economy devoid of substance. –A global financial crisis is inevitable”. (Henry C K Liu “Liquidity boom and looming crisis” Asia Times)

In other words, the “virtual” wealth of Wall Street is a chimera which was created by the Fed’s inexorable expansion of debt. It can vanish in a flash if the sources of liquidity are cut off.

Puru Saxena draws the same conclusion in his article “A Gradual Transition”:

“Thanks to the Federal Reserve’s expansionary monetary policies over the past 5 years, US asset-prices have risen considerably; also known as the “wealth effect”. At the end of last year, the market capitalization of the US stock market rose to a record-high of US$20.6 trillion, matching the value of household real-estate, which also rose to a record-high at the same time. On the surface, this may seem like brilliant news, however you must realize that this “wealth illusion” achieved by an ocean of money and record-high indebtedness is only a consequence of inflation.”

Code Red: Subprime Chernobyl

We expect that the mounting losses in CDOs and the continuing defaults in the housing industry will precipitate a “severe credit crunch” which will end in a stock market crash. A report which appeared yesterday in the UK Telegraph appears to agree with this analysis. Lombard Street Research predicted that:

“Excess liquidity in the global system will be slashed. Banks Capital is about to be decimated, which will require calling in a swathe of loans. This is going to aggravate the US hard landing”‘ (”Banks set to call in swathe of loans” UK Telegraph 6-26-07)

Three of the main hoses which provide liquidity for the market, have either been cut off or severely damaged. These are “securatized” subprime CDOs, corporate mega-mergers and hedge fund leveraging. Without these instruments for expanding debt; liquidity will dry up and stocks will fall. The period of “easy credit” will end in disaster.

We should now be able to see the straight line that connects the Fed’s low interest rates to the impending stock market meltdown. The problems began at the central bank.

Presidential candidate Rep. Ron Paul (R-Texas) summed it up best when he said:

“From the Great Depression, to the stagflation of the seventies, to the burst of the dot.com bubble; every economic downturn suffered by the country over the last 80 years can be traced to Federal Reserve policy. The Fed has followed a consistent policy of flooding the economy with easy money, leading to a misallocation of resources and artificial “boom” followed by recession or depression when the Fed-created bubble bursts”.

Mike Whitney lives in Washington state. He can be reached at: fergiewhitney@msn.com

COUNTERPUNCH

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FT Alphaville- June 28-June 29

Saturday, June 30th, 2007

Bear Stearns fallout — the question of pricing of CDOs

“If every CDO [manager] was forced to mark to market their subprime holdings, it would be — well, I can’t think of a strong enough word to describe what it would be,” an unnamed US policymaker tells the FT’s Saskia Scholtes and Gillian Tett.

In a detailed FT analysis, the two writers examine a central concern of the moment: that the prices attached to many collateralised debt obligations, designed to provide both juicy investment returns and high credit ratings, have not been tested in the market.

Instead, CDOs , have often been valued in investor portfolios or on the books of investment banks according to complex mathematical models and other non-market techniques. Also, fund managers and bankers often have broad discretion as to what kind of model they use — and thus the value attached to their assets.

The crisis at Bear Stearns has left investors, brokers and regulators asking an uncomfortable question: can the pricing models that have provided the foundations for this new financial edifice really be trusted?

The valuation problem for CDOs reflects the fact that the frenetic pace of innovation seen in the financial industry this decade has outpaced the development of its infrastructure. New financial products are often illiquid, but they usually occupy a small niche. But the CDO sector has exploded - last year alone, about $1,000bn in cash and derivative CDOs were issued in Europe and the US, according to the Bank for International Settlements.

Aside from pricing models, holders of CDOs, such as hedge funds, shop for quotations amongst a range of brokers or seek guidance from rating agencies. But as one banker tells the FT: “It is very easy for hedge funds to shop around to find valuations that suit them best and then book their assets at that…Going back to the bank that sold you a CDO and asking for a price is rarely likely to produce an accurate picture.”

Similarly, on the credit rating side, such agencies are focused on assessing the chance of default, noting guiding on how market prices might behave.

Then there is the issue of incentives. Hedge fund managers, for example, are typically paid a percentage of the profits they book, giving them a vested interest in reporting a high asset valuation. At best, this means that the valuations of CDOs may often lag behind any swings in broader asset classes; at worst, this ambiguity may enable hedge fund managers or investment bankers to keep posting profits — even when markets fall.

Amitabh Arora, head of interest rate strategies at Lehman Brothers, points to a further potential impact from the Bear Stearns upheaval. “The bigger risk now is that it calls into question CDOs as a financing vehicle in the corporate credit market — I think in the next six to 12 months we will see a significant reassessment of CDOs as a financial vehicle not just in the subprime world but the corporate world too.”

Some bankers and policymakers argue that this is simply a teething problem that will fade as structured finance becomes more mature. History suggests that most opaque, illiquid markets eventually become more transparent when they grow large enough - but history also shows that large-scale structural dislocations, such as a serious mispricing of assets, are rarely corrected in an orderly manner.

This entry was posted by Paul Murphy on Thursday, June 28th, 2007 at 10:55 and is filed under Capital markets, Hedge funds. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.

The irrelevance of today’s Wall Street banker

Having spent a good many years in the business himself and based a best-selling book on his experiences, William Cohan (ex-Lazard, Merrill Lynch and JPMorgan, and author of the excellent The Last Tycoons: The Secret History of Lazard Frères & Co), should know what he’s talking about when he hails the death of the high-flying Wall Street banker.

Here we are, he writes in Thursday’s FT, smack in the middle of the “Biggest Deal Boom Evaaah”, as The Wall Street Journal noted the other day. And yet, Mr Cohan describes a condition among those “overpaid and overworked” M&A bankers best summed up as relevance deficit disorder.

At the very moment when they have never been busier - flying round the world in private jets to attend infinitely ponderous and desperately important meetings - M&A advisory revenue “has never been more irrelevant to their firms’ bottom lines,” he says.

In a cruel and ironic twist, we are actually witnessing the final death rattle of the once highly prestigious - and still obscenely profitable - business of providing strategic advice to corporate chief executives.

Throughout much of the 1980s and 1990s, M&A bankers reigned supreme on Wall Street. Their names are now legendary and evoke a certain Mt Rushmore-like wistfulness: among them, Felix Rohatyn, Steve Rattner, Bob Greenhill, Bruce Wasserstein, Joe Perella, Ken Wilson and Ira Harris.

No longer, says Mr Cohan:

Since the start of the millennium, Wall Street firms have eschewed promoting brand-name bankers and their flashy takeover tactics in favour of minting money by investing their own capital in proprietary trading, private equity and credit derivatives.

The cold, hard facts of this historic development can be found buried within the recent quarterly financial statements of nearly every big Wall Street firm. Basically, their entire M&A advisory revenue represents a tiny amount of their overall revenue – that even goes for Goldman Sachs, perennially the leading global M&A adviser.

Compounding these quantitative facts is the decline in the qualitative contributions that bankers are making to their clients. The advent of spreadsheet software in the mid-1980s and the corresponding hiring of in-house M&A departments - a company such as Johnson & Johnson may now have 200 M&A people in-house - have exploded that myth of human superiority in dealmaking and, with it, the black-box nature of the M&A business.

Worse, with big-name private equity firms - such as Blackstone, whose partners are themselves largely former M&A bankers - accounting for more than a third of the M&A deal volume this year, bankers at the Wall Street firms and boutiques are relegated to the sidelines. “Deeply dissatisfying,” an unnamed M&A banker told the WSJ about his role lately. A corporate lawyer added dismissively: “Bankers are sitting in coach.”

Beyond squeezing out a crocodile tear, says Mr Cohan,

the demise of the late, great investment banker is remarkable only in that it shows, yet again, how deeply Darwinian Wall Street remains, ever-adapting and taking advantage of the latest opportunities and technologies.

One is tempted to blame the demise on the greediness of Wall Street bankers who control an obscene fee structure based on receiving a fixed percentage of ever-increasing deals. But as information becomes more ubiquitous thanks to the internet and Sarbanes-Oxley, and as the faux-mystery surrounding deals dissipates, even the unlikely prospect of bankers bringing their fees into line with the service they provide will not stop the inevitable.

This entry was posted by Gwen Robinson on Thursday, June 28th, 2007 at 12:07

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“If I had to work here again in this lifetime, I would sooner kill myself”

The following kiss-off email, distributed by a departing JP Morgan Chase-r in New York, is currently doing the rounds. JP Morgan declined to comment. We’ve removed the names…

Subject: Farewell

Dear Co-Workers and Managers,

As many of you probably know, today is my last day. But before I leave, I wanted to take this opportunity to let you know what a great and distinct pleasure it has been to type “Today is my last day.”

For nearly as long as I’ve worked here, I’ve hoped that I might one day leave this company. And now that this dream has become a reality, please know that I could not have reached this goal without your unending lack of support. Words cannot express my gratitude for the words of gratitude you did not express.

I would especially like to thank all of my managers both past and present but with the exception of the wonderful **** ****: in an age where miscommunication is all too common, you consistently impressed and inspired me with the sheer magnitude of your misinformation, ignorance and intolerance for true talent. It takes a strong man to admit his mistake - it takes a stronger man to attribute his mistake to me.

Over the past seven years, you have taught me more than I could ever ask for and, in most cases, ever did ask for. I have been fortunate enough to work with some absolutely interchangeable supervisors on a wide variety of seemingly identical projects - an invaluable lesson in overcoming daily tedium in overcoming daily tedium in overcoming daily tedium.

Your demands were high and your patience short, but I take great solace knowing that my work was, as stated on my annual review, “meets expectation.” That is the type of praise that sends a man home happy after a 10 hour day, smiling his way through half a bottle of meets expectation scotch with a meets expectation cigar. Thanks ****!

And to most of my peers: even though we barely acknowledged each other within these office walls, I hope that in the future, should we pass on the street, you will regard me the same way as I regard you: sans eye contact.

But to those few souls with whom I’ve actually interacted, here are my personalized notes of farewell:

To **** ****, I will not miss hearing you cry over absolutely nothing while laying blame on me and my coworkers. Your racial comments about *** ******* were truly offensive and I hope that one day you might gain the strength to apologize to him.

To **** **** whom is long gone, I hope you find a manager that treats you as poorly as you have treated us. I worked harder for you then any manager in my career and I regret every ounce of it. Watching you take credit for my work was truly demoralizing.

To **** ****, you should learn how to keep your mouth shut sweet heart. Bad mouthing the innocent is a negative thing, especially when your talking about someone who knows your disgusting secrets.  ; )

To **** **** (Mr. Cronyism Jr), well, I wish you had more of a back bone. You threw me to the wolves with that witch **** and I learned all too much from it. I still can’t believe that after following your instructions, I ended up getting written up, wow. Thanks for the experience buddy, lesson learned.

**** **** (Mr. Cronyism Sr), I’m happy that you were let go in the same manner that you have handed down to my dedicated coworkers. Hearing you on the phone last year brag about how great bonuses were going to be for you fellas in upper management because all of the lay offs made me nearly vomit. I never expected to see management benefit financially from the suffering of scores of people but then again, with this company’s rooted history in the slave trade it only makes sense.

To all of the executives of this company, Jamie Dimon and such. Despite working through countless managers that practiced unethical behavior, racism, sexism, jealousy and cronyism, I have benefited tremendously by working here and I truly thank you for that. There was once a time where hard work was rewarded and acknowledged, it’s a pity that all of our positive output now falls on deaf ears and passes blind eyes. My advice for you is to place yourself closer to the pulse of this company and enjoy the effort and dedication of us “faceless little people” more.

There are many great people that are being over worked and mistreated but yet are still loyal not to those who abuse them but to the greater mission of providing excellent customer support. Find them and embrace them as they will help battle the cancerous plague that is ravishing the moral of this company.

So, in parting, if I could pass on any word of advice to the lower salary recipient (”because it’s good for the company”) in India or Tampa who will soon be filling my position, it would be to cherish this experience because a job opportunity like this comes along only once in a lifetime.

Meaning: if I had to work here again in this lifetime, I would sooner kill myself.

To those who I have held a great relationship with, I will miss being your co-worker and will cherish our history together. Please don’t bother responding as at this very moment I am most likely in my car doing 85 with the windows down listening to Biggie.

One!

This entry was posted by Paul Murphy on Friday, June 29th, 2007 at 11:03

Alphaville

Alphaville- June 28-June 29

 

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Saturday, June 30th, 2007

Establishment Of IOSCO Technical Committee Conference, Tokyo Website
Exchange News Direct, UK - Jun 27, 2007
The homepage for the ”IOSCO Technical Committee Conference, Tokyo”, which will be hosted by the Financial Services Agency (FAS) on November 8 and 9, …
Aima welcomes Iosco’s endorsement of its valuation principles
HedgeWeek, UK - Jun 26, 2007
Aima will continue to work closely alongside Iosco and other regulatory bodies worldwide on valuation and other issues as the hedge fund industry continues …

AIMA RESPONDS TO IOSCO VALUATION PRINCIPLES
HedgeCo.net, FL - Jun 25, 2007
AIMA is pleased to acknowledge that the IOSCO document has accurately captured all key issues raised in AIMA’s Guide. AIMA registers its view that, …

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Slowdown? What slowdown?

Saturday, June 30th, 2007

U.S. Deal-Making Topped $1 Trillion in First Half

June 29, 2007, 7:58 am

Slowdown? What slowdown?

If the global deal machine is running out of gas, you wouldn’t know it from these numbers. The volume of mergers and acquisitions in the United States topped $1 trillion in the first half of 2007, a record for the first six months of any year, according to Dealogic. Deal activity was even stronger in Europe, where the combined value of mergers so far this year surpassed U.S totals for the first time in four years.

Goldman Sachs has been riding the deal wave. The investment bank was ranked the top M&A adviser across the world, in the U.S. and in Europe during the first six months of the year, Dealogic said. Goldman, which advised on 223 deals worth $788 billion, was followed by Morgan Stanley and Citigroup in the global M&A ranking.

The first-half figures suggest that, even if fears of a slowdown come true, 2007 is likely to break deal-making records. Dag Skattum, J.P. Morgan Chase’s global co-head of mergers and acquisitions, told Reuters that “it’s undoubtedly going to be the biggest M&A market ever.”

There are some ominous signs, however. April was the busiest month for deals so far this year, while June was the slowest. Volatile debt markets and concerns about interest rates have sparked concerns that the recent run of big deals, which has been driven in large part by debt-financed leveraged buyouts, could hit a wall.

Still, Stefan Selig, global head of mergers and acquisitions at Bank of America Securities, told CNNMoney.com, “It doesn’t look like the world is ending to me. No one has put their pencils down. The market’s return to more sane levels is generally a good thing.”

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Caliber Global: London fund latest subprime victim

Saturday, June 30th, 2007

London fund latest subprime victim

By FT Reporters

Published: June 28 2007 11:41 | Last updated: June 29 2007 01:44

The retreat from risk in global credit markets gathered pace on Thursday as investors demanded stricter terms for high-yield bond issues and a London hedge fund said it would wind down after suffering big losses on US subprime mortgages.

Caliber Global Investment, a London-listed fund, said it would sell its assets and return capital to investors after a review found “insufficient demand currently” for exposure to the subprime mortgage market. The review was triggered by an $8.8m (£4.4m) net loss from subprime investments.

The $900m fund will wind down over the next 12 months. It is managed by hedge fund Cambridge Place Investment Management, whose founders included Martin Finegold, founder of subprime lender Kensington Group.

Carlyle Group, the US private equity company, also delayed – at the last minute – the flotation in Amsterdam of an investment fund dealing in residential mortgage-backed securities in order to cut the offer price because of market volatility.

Carlyle said the fund had no exposure to US subprime mortgages. However, people familiar with the plans said the intended flotation had suffered knock-on effects of volatility. The company said it was confident the IPO would go ahead next week.

The developments follow the cancellations or postponements of several other debt offerings this week and come amid questions about whether the cheap debt that has fuelled the buy-out boom is still as easily available.

Dollar General, a leading US retail chain, was on Thursday forced to shelve its planned offering of $725m in “payment-in-kind toggle” notes – an aggressive financing structure that allows borrowers to choose whether to pay investors back in cash or additional debt. The company also added protective covenants to sell $1.2bn of high-yield debt.

Separately, CanWest MediaWorks, a Canadian media company, downsized its own high-yield offering from $650m to $400m.

“The balance between sellers of debt and buyers of debt is evening out,” said Eirik Winter, co-head of fixed income capital markets at Citi. “Investors are taking a step back and saying that we have a lot of cash, but we are going to be more cautious and will not buy just anything.”

Reporting by Joanna Chung, Peter Thal Larsen, Martin Arnold in London, Ian Bickerton in Amsterdam and Saskia Scholtes and James Mackintosh in New York

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007

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Saturday, June 30th, 2007

Axed deals reflect subprime chill

By Lina Saigol and Joanna Chung in London and Richard Beales in New York

Published: June 27 2007 19:37 | Last updated: June 27 2007 23:53

Companies are pulling financing deals across the globe, in one of the clearest signs yet that investors’ worries about rising interest rates and US subprime mortgages could be infecting other areas of the credit world and driving up the cost of corporate borrowing.

MISC, the world’s biggest owner of liquefied gas tankers, day shelved its $750m bond offering.

VIDEO

Charis GresserCharis Gresser

on signs of growing buyer resistance in the leveraged buyout market

The move came a day after US Foodservice, the American division of Ahold, the Dutch supermarket group, postponed its $650m bond offering and Arcelor Finance put plans for its euro-denominated benchmark bond issue on hold, citing turbulent market conditions.

The bonds and loan deals were pulled after investors refused to buy them under the proposed terms, demanding higher premiums and more protection.

Stephen Green, chairman of HSBC, on Wednesday fuelled investor concern when he suggested that some large corporate deal would collapse because of over-leverage. In an interview with the Financial Times, he said he was “worried by the degree of leverage in some big ticket transactions nowadays” and felt that “something is going to end in tears”.

He also warned that losses could be higher because the parcelling out of risk to so many parties across the financial system could make it more difficult to arrange a rescue – a comment that highlighted widespread and growing unease among senior banking executives.

The pulled deals highlight the growing risk-aversion among investors amid rising global interest rates and nervousness about credit markets following the near-collapse of two hedge funds owned by Bear Stearns that have heavy exposure to the US subprime market.

Many investors are now reassessing risk, which could force up the cost of doing deals and cause a sharp slowdown in private equity activity.

Investors appear to be rejecting deals involving the riskiest structures, including payment-in-kind or Pik notes – which allow borrowers to pay investors with more bonds rather than cash – and “covenant-lite” loans – which offer less protection to investors.

Although the subprime market is only a small corner of the credit world, developments there have fuelled unease in other financial sectors – and, in particular, raised questions about the valuations of complex and illiquid securities.

This is particularly true of collateralised debt obligations, or CDOs, which allow lenders to pass on the debt by slicing it up into tranches and bundling it together to sell on to investors.

Amitabh Arora, New York-based head of interest rate strategies at Lehman Brothers, said: “The bigger risk now is that it calls into question CDOs as a financing vehicle in the corporate credit market.”

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007

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