Subprime Sullies Reputations - Martin Fridson
Wednesday, October 31st, 2007Adviser Soapbox
Subprime Sullies Reputations
Martin Fridson, Leverage World 10.31.07, 11:00 AM ET
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True to form, underwriters and money managers blame wildly improbable, unforeseeable confluences of events for disastrous losses recently incurred by structured finance investors. Theory upholds their view that the circumstances leading to the losses could have not been predicted, as enlightened self-interest supposedly guarantees that assets can never become radically overvalued. One problem with this theory is that the penalties for exhibiting unenlightened self-interest are remarkably light.
Financial debacles such as this year’s subprime mortgage crisis and the backup of leveraged buyout loans generate predictable responses from individuals associated with large-scale wealth destruction. They customarily excuse themselves on the grounds that the latest collapse resulted from unprecedented and therefore unforeseeable events. This pattern has been followed recently by hedge fund managers whose limited partners suffered huge losses, and by investment banking executives who presided over massive write-offs, for which shareholders bear the brunt.
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Actually, the fact that an event is unprecedented does not automatically demonstrate that it was unforeseeable. Consider, for example, the lethal combination of dubious subprime collateral (including undocumented “liar loans”) and risk transfer via collateralized debt obligations. This particular mix of financial innovations was not prominent in any period prior to the present cycle, so by definition the form of the resulting explosion was unprecedented.
It does not follow that the possibility, or even the probability, of outsized losses was apparent only with 20/20 hindsight. Seasoned observers did in fact warn that the risks were out of line with investors’ potential returns. They made reasonable inferences from the presence of certain key elements that triggered busts in previous cycles. One example was the decline in underwriting standards made possible by risk transfer.
Much empirical work would be required to substantiate the claim that the risk of structured finance vehicles was recognizably out of line with their potential return. Such analysis is beyond the scope of the present article. Merely to suggest the existence of a market failure, however, imposes a duty to offer a plausible explanation.
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“Reputational Capital”
Market psychology is the solution to the problem of apparent inefficiency favored by self-anointed experts who are not bound by any standard of scientific proof. These include technical analysts and many pundit-visionaries based in the media. They assert that investors’ spontaneous swings from collective greed to collective fear and vice versa cause prices to lurch from one extreme to the other.
Why investors suddenly undergo violent mood swings is never explained. Neither is serious consideration given to an easier-to-swallow cause/effect relationship–namely, that rising prices cause investors to turn optimistic (and falling prices produce pessimism), rather than the reverse.
A more productive line of analysis focuses on the eminently rational behavior produced by offering someone a better-than-fair proposition. Suppose lenders can earn fees by approving loans but hand off the credit risk. Their sensible response is to approve as many loans as possible by the simple expedient of discarding all proven credit standards. Structured finance makes such a strategy feasible as long as unsophisticated investors can be induced to overpay for the deliberately complex, difficult-to-evaluate equity tranches.
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In the minds of financial economists who love markets without having actual experience with them, systematic pricing of this sort can never happen. The last line of defense for market efficiency, they say, is intermediaries’ concern for reputational capital. According to the textbooks, underwriters and asset managers will eschew “heads I win, tails you lose” behavior that disadvantages customers, lest they lose the trust of potential future customers. In practice, unfortunately, reputational capital is almost as great a delusion as market psychology.
Sensitivity to outcomes for the buyers is a logical consideration for investment banks, because they truly are intermediaries. Being perceived as an honest broker by both issuers and investors is an advantage, as they must deal regularly with both parties. There is an inherent bias toward the issuer’s interest, however. A corporate borrower is not obliged to deal with more than one lead underwriter and can therefore pit the investment banks against one another on the basis of willingness to foist unfavorable pricing and covenants on investors.
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Portfolio managers, on the other hand, must deal with all or at least most major underwriters if they are to construct adequately diversified portfolios out of the available primary supply. The buy-siders, consequently, are not in a strong position to force underwriters to compete by imposing investor-friendly terms on issuers. At best, a portfolio manager can put an underwriter into the penalty box for a month or two.
Shareholders theoretically constitute a second line of defense. They can punish an investment bank’s management for bad decisions that lead to multibillion-dollar write-offs by “voting with their feet,” i.e., by selling their shares. Senior managers may be well compensated enough to be indifferent to the resulting decline in the value of their own holdings, but shareholder dissatisfaction can conceivably lead to their ouster. The more usual outcome, however, is that the second-level managers most directly responsible for the losses get the ax, and the chief executive officer expresses regret about the underlings’ irresponsibility.
Not surprisingly, this allocation of blame tends to be upheld by securities analysts. They have little to gain and much to lose by pointing the finger at canny executives who have risen to the top in large part through their survivorship skills.
As for hedge fund managers, the record indicates little need to worry about reputational capital. Far from decreeing lifetime banishment for managers who inflict huge losses on the limited partners, investors insist on their right to a second chance. Phoenix-like, the spectacularly underperforming portfolio managers raise new funds, often after remarkably short periods of dust settling. The theory seems to be that the greater the assets under management they were in a position to blow away, the greater must be their ability.
Famous examples from the past include John Meriwether of Long-Term Capital Management and Brian Hunter of Amaranth Advisers.
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Market Inefficiency
In theory, financial markets have built-in, self-correcting mechanisms that keep valuations at least roughly in line with intrinsic value. Rational self-interest prevents knowledgeable investors from willingly accepting more risk than the associated, expected return justifies. Concern for preserving reputational capital prevents professionals from placing unknowledgeable investors in an unfavorable risk-reward position. Professionals who violate that trust are eliminated from the field.
So much for theory. If investors are too willing to give unskilled speculators a second chance, the controls break down, assets get overvalued and impossibly large losses become possible. By all appearances, this is not merely a theoretical problem, and there is no particular reason to suppose it will disappear. Regardless of the lessons investors may have learned from the subprime crisis, we should expect to see many more financial debacles in the future.
Martin Fridson, CFA, is editor of Leverage World. Visit www.fridsonvision.com or e-mail Martin@FridsonVision.com.
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