Archive for January, 2008

Oil Below $91 on Weak US data, Recession Worries

Thursday, January 31st, 2008

Oil Below $91 on Weak US data, Recession Worries


Sectors:Oil and Gas

By Reuters | 31 Jan 2008 | 09:16 PM ET

Oil fell below $91 a barrel on Friday, ahead of Friday’s OPEC meeting, as a fresh set of weak U.S. economic data heightened fears the world’s top energy consumer was sliding into a recession.

Oil Pipeline

Bela Szandelszky / AP


U.S. light, sweet crude

NYMEX CRUDE OIL FUTURES Front Month

US%40CL.1


91.03  -0.72  -0.78

BIS

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[US@CL.1  91.03    -0.72  (-0.78%)]

was down 99 cents at $90.76 a barrel in the Asian session, after losing more than $1 earlier, and settling down 58 cents in New York on Thursday. London Brent crude

IPE BRENT CRUDE Future Front Month C

GB%40IB.1


91.56  -0.65  -0.7

KRF - US

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[GB@IB.1  91.56    -0.65  (-0.7%)]

was trading lower.

“The market is taking profit on concerns over the U.S. growth and increasing fears of a recession,” said Mark Pervan of ANZ Bank in Melbourne.

Business activity in the U.S. Midwest expanded in January but at a slightly slower rate than expected, as new orders dropped and price pressures accelerated, a report showed on Thursday.

The National Association of Purchasing Management-Chicago business barometer fell to 51.5 from 56.4 in December, originally reported at 56.6.

Economists had forecast the index at 52.0. The employment component of the index fell to 47.0 from 49.3 in December.

Tata Chemicals Ltd. unit said it agreed to buy soda-ash maker General Chemical Industrial Products Inc. of the U.S. for $1.01 billion

Thursday, January 31st, 2008

Buy It All?
Another Merger
For India’s Tata

By JACKIE RANGE
February 1, 2008

NEW DELHI — In the latest sign of the global ambitions of Tata Group as well as other Indian corporate buyers, its Tata Chemicals Ltd. unit said it agreed to buy soda-ash maker General Chemical Industrial Products Inc. of the U.S. for $1.01 billion.

Tata Chemicals, which is 30%-owned by the Tata Group, produces inorganic chemicals, fertilizers, food additives, and is a large producer of soda ash. Soda ash is used for making glass and in powdered detergents, among other things.

GLOBAL PLAYER

 

The News: Tata Chemicals, part of India’s Tata Group empire, is buying a U.S. company, General Chemical Industrial Products.

Significance: It’s part of the zest for global mergers by Tata and other Indian companies in general. Tata in particular has its merger sights set outside India.

What’s Next: Even with the slowdown in the U.S. economy, which could hurt India, too, the Indian companies are expected to seek to buy more overseas firms.

General Chemical Industrial Products is majority owned by the Harbinger Capital Partners hedge fund, a New York investment firm that is part of Harbert Management Corp. of Birmingham, Ala. A spokesman for Harbinger Capital Partners declined to comment.

The deal comes as the Tata Group, India’s flagship conglomerate, is increasingly looking beyond India to buy companies.

[Tata group acquisitions chart]

Tata Steel Ltd. agreed to buy Anglo-Dutch steel company Corus Group PLC last year for around £6.2 billion, or about $12 billion. Tata Motors Ltd., which recently brought out a new small car that will retail for $2,500, is the preferred bidder to buy the Jaguar and Land Rover brands from Ford Motor Co., a deal expected to be unveiled in coming weeks.

Indian companies are becoming bigger players in global mergers and acquisitions.

Thomson Financial calculates that Indian companies did outbound cross-border deals valued at $22.5 billion last year and $24.7 billion in 2006, up from $3.6 billion in 2005.

Companies here have been dealt a strong hand by India’s booming economy and the rupee’s gain against the dollar. Last year, the rupee rose more than 12% against the U.S. currency.

“This is a timely acquisition from an Indian viewpoint,” said Homi Khusrokhan, Tata Chemicals managing director, in a meeting with reporters. “We are picking up a U.S. asset at a time when the Indian rupee is strong.”

The deal will make Tata Chemicals one of the world’s biggest soda-ash producers and give it access to markets in North America, Latin America and the Far East, complementing its existing markets, Tata Chemicals said. General Chemical Industrial Products’ soda-ash business has mining and manufacturing facilities at Green River Basin, Wyoming. The business Tata is buying has annual revenue of close to $400 million.

Indian companies are expected to continue snapping up firms overseas despite the slowdown in the U.S. economy, which is forecast to take a toll on India’s economic growth as well.

“There are many strong companies in India, and they are going to have the ability to continue to do cross-border M&A,” said Prahlad Shantigram, managing director of corporate finance at Standard Chartered Bank in Mumbai. “If a deal makes economic sense, there will continue to be M&A.” Standard Chartered Bank was one of the advisers on the purchase.

Still, investors appeared wary.

Tata Chemicals shares closed down 7.3% at 305 rupees ($7.76) apiece on the Bombay Stock Exchange, underperforming the broader market. India’s benchmark Sensex index shed 0.6% to 17648.71.

Tata Chemicals has four soda-ash facilities, in India, the U.K., the Netherlands and Kenya. The facilities outside India were acquired as part of its 2005 purchase of Brunner Mond Group Ltd. of the U.K.

The new deal remains subject to shareholder and regulatory approvals and the company didn’t give a time frame for closing it.

 

–Raghavendra Upadhyaya, Rumman Ahmed and Vibhuti Agarwal contributed to this article.

Write to Jackie Range at jackie.range@dowjones.com

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120177712978531805.html

?mod=us_business_whats_news

Harbert

http://www.harbert.net/distressed-event-special-situations/

 

PT Danatama Makmur

Thursday, January 31st, 2008

League Tables 2008: Indonesia 1; Lazard, Lehman & DB 0

Wall Street, meet PT Danatama Makmur, your newest league table competition.

The Indonesian brokerage house slid in at No. 10 on the all-important global league table of announced deal volume for January, according to Dealogic. That puts it ahead of such league table stalwarts as Lehman Brothers Holdings, Deutsche Bank and the firm that helped pioneer the M&A advisory business — Lazard. It also is just $800 million less than Morgan Stanley’s total.

Danatama Makmur landed on the league tables thanks to its role, along with Credit Suisse Group, advising Bakrie & Brothers. The holding company controlled by the Bakrie family announced acquisitions of stakes in three companies valued at a total $5.1 billion.

Yes, one month is too short a time period from which to draw any significant conclusions. And yes, Danatama Makmur slipped into the league table by advising on essentially one deal, so it seems unlikely that the brokerage house will be listed on the year-end league tables.

Still, an emerging-market bank joining — however briefly — the ranks of the banking elite is a symbolic moment. It builds in some ways on a point WSJ.com Executive Editor Alan Murray made about this year’s World Economic Forum in Davos on Monday: “This year, it is finally clear that the U.S. is no longer the only big kid on campus.”

In fact, if there is anything to be drawn from this month’s league tables, it is the importance of Asia as a whole to global deal making. Volume in the U.S. and Europe this month fell off precipitously from the year earlier period — down 58% and 25%, respectively. In contrast, deal volume in Asia jumped 50%, according to Dealogic. Asia also accounted for 26% of world-wide deal volume, compared with just 11% last year.

All of which has Deal Journal wondering: Though Danatama Makmur’s stay on the league tables may be short lived, how long before investment banks from China and India are fixtures on the global league tables?

| Trackback URL: http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2008/01/31/league-tables-

2008-indonesia-1-lazard-lehman-db-0/trackback

ndonesia’s Truba Jaya plans IPO in February

Sun Jan 13, 2008 11:44pm EST

JAKARTA, Jan 14 (Reuters) - Indonesian engineering firm Truba Jaya Engineering Tbk aims to list its shares on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in February to finance the construction of some projects, the company said on Monday.

Truba, an affiliate of energy and engineering firm PT Truba Alam Manunggal Engineering Tbk TRUB.JK, plans to offer 3.2 billion new shares between Feb.18-20, or around 21 percent of its share capital. The company did not elaborate on the price or the indicative amount it plans to raise from the IPO.

Truba will also offer 3.2 billion warrants. PT Danatama Makmur has been appointed as the underwriter for the offering.

A number of Indonesian companies plan to tap the country’s capital market to raise funds on the Indonesia Stock Exhange which is trading around historically high levels.

In 2007, Indonesian companies raised 17.5 trillion rupiah ($1.86 billion) from initial public offerings, nearly six times the amount in the previous year. ($1 = 9,432 rupiah) (Reporting by Harry Suhartono, editing by Valerie Lee)

© Reuters 2007. All rights reserved.

http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USJAK190820080114

Junk Yields Flashing Back To ‘01 Slump

Thursday, January 31st, 2008

There are about $900 billion in U.S. junk bonds outstanding, according to Moody’s.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120165818624927345.html?mod

=loomia&loomia_si=t0:a16:g2:r2:c0.117212

AHEAD OF THE TAPE

Junk Yields
Flashing Back
To ‘01 Slump

By SCOTT PATTERSON
January 30, 2008; Page C1

As Federal Reserve officials discuss the economic outlook today, they might want to turn their attention to junk bonds, which are flashing red.

[Chart]

In June, the Merrill Lynch High-Yield Bond Index showed junk bonds yielded about 2.4 percentage points more than low-risk Treasurys, an all-time low that suggested investors saw little risk in the sector. Last week, “spreads” over Treasurys reached 7.5 percentage points, the highest level in more than five years and very near levels in 2001, a recession year. The amount spreads have widened the past several months — five percentage points — is also in keeping with their move over 18 months in 2000 and 2001.

Investors are demanding higher premiums on junk bonds because they fear defaults will rise.

Junk-bond issuance is evaporating. Through yesterday, $850 million in high-yield debt had been issued for the month, compared with $8.5 billion for all of January last year, according to Thomson Financial. Barring a last-minute surge, it will be the slowest start to a year for junk since 1991, another recession year.

“High yield is the canary in the coal mine,” says Greg Hopper, manager of Julius Baer Global High Income Fund.

The worry is striking because only 0.9% of outstanding junk bonds defaulted last year. Though defaults recently have started creeping up, the default rate is still well below its long-term average of 4.4%. The rate at the start of the last recession was 8% and peaked at 11.2% in January 2002. In other words, investors are pricing in a dramatic deterioration.

The drop in junk issuance is problematic for stocks. The past few years, many companies used junk bonds to finance share buybacks. Private-equity firms used them to help finance takeovers. Those tailwinds for stocks are gone for now.

Costlier junk also means many companies will pay more to refinance debt. There are about $900 billion in U.S. junk bonds outstanding, according to Moody’s.

Perhaps investors have pushed junk bonds too far. If they’re right, though, the corporate outlook is going to get very bad, very fast.

Fourth-Quarter Profits: Dead Weight Financials

Before companies started reporting fourth-quarter earnings, analysts braced for dismal news, estimating earnings fell by more than 9% from a year earlier. Still, they were too optimistic.

By the end of the week, more than half of the companies in the S&P 500 will have reported. Earnings per share are on track to fall 20.4%, year-over-year, according to Thomson, the worst performance since the fourth quarter 2001.

It’s almost all financials. The sector went from a $56 billion profit in the fourth quarter of 2006 to a $2.5 billion loss at the end of 2007, largely due to another wave of write-offs. Not since the fourth quarter of 2001 — when transports collapsed — has an entire industry’s gone into the red, Thomson’s David Dropsy says.

Earnings for the rest of the S&P 500 aren’t bad. They’re on track for an 11.4% gain. But be wary of analysts who advise you to ignore financials. That’s sort of like ignoring food and energy prices when talking about inflation: Nice in theory, but not terribly indicative of reality.

–Mark Gongloff

 Send comments to scott.patterson@wsj.com or mark.gongloff@wsj.com http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120165818624927345.html?mod=loomia

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Thursday, January 31st, 2008

Good Plan, but Who Will Pay?

Street Firms Wrangle
Over the Particulars
Of Bond-Insurer Aid

By SUSANNE CRAIG and LIAM PLEVEN
January 30, 2008; Page C2

Regulators are pursuing a plan to shore up troubled bond-insurance companies — linchpins of modern debt markets. But the Wall Street firms that would put up cash are already wrangling over how much each should have to pony up.

[Joseph Perella]

Talks are preliminary, and a deal is far from certain at this point, according to people close to the negotiations. Already some firms are raising questions about the various plans, offering insight into just how hard it will be for regulators to broker a bailout.

Currently, regulators and bankers are bandying around three or so possible solutions. But the main stumbling blocks are these questions: Is a plan even needed? And if so, how will the tab for each bank be calculated?

Last week, New York state insurance regulators met with banks in hopes of structuring a bailout of some of the nation’s biggest bond insurers, including Ambac Financial Group Inc. and MBIA Inc. Bond insurers are at the center of the mortgage-debt storm because they have guaranteed billions of dollars of financial instruments now going sour. If the mortgage-market tumult results in downgrading of the bond insurers, a new wave of write-downs on Wall Street are likely.

This also has spillover into the municipal-bond market because the insurers cover many bonds issued by local governments to finance local roads, schools and other projects. If triple-A insurance is harder to get, it could increase the cost of borrowing for those governments.

Senior executives of Wall Street’s top firms, including Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch & Co.,Citigroup Inc. and Goldman Sachs Group Inc., met last week with New York State Insurance Superintendent Eric Dinallo. Since then, the department has hired Wall Street firm Perella Weinberg Partners LP, run by former Morgan Stanley executive Joseph R. Perella, to help put together a rescue plan.

Among the possible solutions being formulated are capital infusions from outside investors or the banks themselves. The Wall Street firms could also arrange to provide a massive line of credit to the bond insurers, giving those firms a cushion of cash.

Another possibility is that the banks could fund a newly created firm that would assume some of the risks or liabilities on bond insurers’ books — an arrangement known as reinsurance. This could free up capital to the insurers but is unattractive to some Wall Street firms wary of taking on unpredictable liability.

The first stumbling block, said one senior Wall Street executive, is that no one has yet put a figure on just how big the big the bailout would need to be. Figures so far range from $3 billion to $15 billion.

There has been discussion between regulators and the Wall Street firms that each bank should contribute the same amount, which has appeal because of its simplicity.

However, it quickly gets complicated, given that the banks themselves have differing levels of risk exposure to the bonds in question and also have differing abilities to provide cash. Calculating how much each should put up on a pro rata basis could be complicated and spark disagreement.

Not everyone thinks it will be tough to find an acceptable formula. “As long as it was fairly objective and accurate, I don’t think that would be a problem,” says one person familiar with the matter.

Still, one Wall Street executive said a pro rata solution will have to look not only at how much exposure each Wall Street firm has to each bond company, but also at which insurance company the exposure is to, because some firms need more money than others to help protect their triple-A ratings.

Another wrinkle: Any downgrade will affect the business of issuing new municipal bonds. Therefore, some firms involved in talks with Mr. Dinallo’s office are arguing that companies with a big muni-bond business should kick in more.

Several executives involved in the talks say federal officials may need to get involved if a deal is to be struck. But so far, neither the Treasury nor the Federal Reserve has taken an active role.

–David Enrich contributed to this article.

Write to Susanne Craig at susanne.craig@wsj.com and Liam Pleven at liam.pleven@wsj.com

Bond ‘Transformers’

Thursday, January 31st, 2008

The Bond ‘Transformers’

Regulators Revisit
A Loophole Allowing
Insurers to Do Swaps

By SERENA NG and SUSAN PULLIAM
January 30, 2008; Page C1

Troubles at U.S. bond insurers are forcing industry regulators to rethink a decade-old legal loophole that allowed insurers to venture into the obscure world of derivatives.

THE TRANSFORMERS

 

 The Issue: Insurance regulators created a legal loophole in 1998 that allowed bond insurers to get into the derivatives business through shell companies known as transformers.

 Background: Bond insurers were looking to find new profit streams outside of municipal bond guarantees, and wanted to sell derivatives called credit default swaps to banks.

 What’s Next: With some insurers now struggling, regulators are looking at whether to change the rules that enabled bond insurers to issue derivatives through the transformers.

The housing downturn is threatening to cripple some bond insurers that wrote billions of dollars of guarantees in the past few years on securities backed by risky subprime-mortgage debt. They entered into contracts known as credit-default swaps, which are derivative instruments that require firms to pay out money when a bond defaults. The ability of bond insurers to make good on their guarantees is in question.

Their problems have led New York state Insurance Superintendent Eric Dinallo in recent days to attempt a rescue plan to save bond insurers that could involve financial help from Wall Street firms.

Some of the Street firms already have reported losses tied to the contracts with bond insurers because the insurers may not be able to make good on them. (How much should each Wall Street firm pony up? Please see related article.)

It also is forcing insurance regulators, including Mr. Dinallo’s office, to reconsider the 1998 legal loophole that allowed bond insurers to issue credit-default swaps through shell companies called “transformers.”

Their activity in derivatives has exploded in recent years. With a credit-default swap, one party, for a fee, assumes the risk that a bond or loan will go bad. The bond insurers wrote such swaps on around $100 billion in complex mortgage securities during the past few years, according to ratings-company estimates.

Previously, the bond insurers’ business was mostly limited to providing guarantees, based on their triple-A ratings, on bonds issued by municipalities. As margins in the municipal-bond insurance business fell in the 1990s, bond insurers began looking for other profit engines. In 1998, they asked that New York insurance regulators allow them to sell credit-default swaps on asset-backed and mortgage securities.

[Eric Dinallo]

In a letter to the New York insurance department in 1998, an insurer, Financial Security Assurance Inc., argued that such swaps deals were similar to FSA’s existing business of providing guarantees on other types of bonds, albeit through insurance contracts.

“From bond insurers’ vantage point, this was identical to their core business,” although it involved a different type of contract, said Bruce Stern, FSA’s general counsel, who wrote the 1998 letter. “A demand was emerging for guarantees of bond portfolios and it seemed natural for bond insurers to want to do that,” he said. FSA has avoided big losses that have hit other bond insurers because it didn’t enter the riskiest parts of the business, he said. FSA is a unit of Dexia SA of Brussels.

An insurance examiner working for Paul M. De Robertis, a supervisor in the department’s property-casualty bureau, responded in April 1999 that the insurance regulator concurred “with your interpretation of the insurance law.”

“Other insurers saw this FSA letter and that is how the ‘transformer’ business got a boost,” said Joseph Buonanno, whose law firm, Hunton & Williams LLP, represented a number of bond insurers in recent years that set up such entities. After New York insurance regulators gave bond insurers their blessing, other state insurance regulators followed suit and the business of writing credit-default swaps on packages of mortgage securities took off.

Following the regulatory green light, bond insurers set up shell companies under Delaware state law. They were known in the industry as transformers because they transformed a traditional bond-insurance contract into a credit-default swap.

Among the transformers used by the bond insurers were LaCrosse Financial Products LLC, which was the transformer for MBIA Inc.; Ambac Financial Group Inc.’s transformer was called Ambac Credit Products LLC.

Transformers’ Tentacles

The transformers, which in many cases were private companies incorporated in Delaware, issued credit-default swaps to banks and Wall Street firms on corporate and mortgage securities, including many pools of debt known as collateralized debt obligations.

The bond insurers, in turn, guaranteed the transformers’ obligations, which required them to pay the interest and principal on the bonds if the securities defaulted. The liabilities of the transformers were consolidated with the financial statements of the bond insurers.

From the perspective of the bond insurers, their obligations under the credit-default swaps business were similar to traditional municipal bond insurance. In both cases, the insurer had to make interest and principal payouts to customers if a bond defaulted.

The bond insurers “always looked at what they were doing as substance over form,” said Michael Satz, a former chief executive officer of ACA Financial Guaranty Corp. who left the bond insurer in 2004. The bond insurers “needed to create a structural mechanism that would allow them to participate in [the swaps] market and not violate applicable laws.” ACA Financial is a unit of ACA Capital Holdings Inc.

A report in 2003 from the Bank for International Settlements said that in some countries bond insurers are prohibited from directly entering into derivative transactions. It said these firms have “found ways to circumvent this restriction” by setting up transformers.

In 2005, the business began to boom. Wall Street firms had won a battle with bond insurers that forced them to adopt the Street’s preferred form of documentation for such transactions — counting them essentially as derivative contracts, rather than insurance contracts. That allowed Street firms to profit from the transactions.

Wall Street Saw Profits

After the housing market started slowing, bond insurers dove deeper into the business in 2006 and 2007, bond insurance officials and lawyers said.

For Wall Street firms, the bond insurers’ willingness to sell credit-default swaps was a potential bonanza. The swings in the market values of the swaps these transformers sold to Wall Street helped the banks offset fluctuations in the value of the bonds underlying their own transactions. The swaps also benefited the banks by freeing capital, because it allowed the banks to move commitments off their balance sheets. In many cases, the deals enabled the banks to book sizable profits upfront.

Banks used a trading strategy known as the “negative basis trade,” according to industry participants. This involved buying, say, a highly rated security issued by a collateralized debt obligation — or a pool of packaged bonds — and simultaneously purchasing a credit-default swap that served as insurance on the same security. They often purchased these swaps through the transformers set up by bond insurers.

Banks profited on the interest-rate differences between the CDOs they bought and the payments they made to transformers. For instance, they might be paid an annual interest rate of 0.3 percentage point above a benchmark rate on the CDO, and in turn pay 0.15 percentage point of that to a bond insurer annually as an insurance premium.

The difference between the two payments was called the “negative basis,” and the banks sometimes booked profits upfront on the streams of income they expected to receive.

New Rules Coming?

Now, regulators are looking at whether to change the rules that led to the creation of transformers.

“Obviously, there is a careful line we need to walk. We don’t want to stop financial innovation. But on the other hand, crisis and scandals aren’t good for the financial markets,” said David Neustadt, a spokesman for the New York insurance department.

“It’s too early to say we’re going to ban all these products,” said Guenther Ruch, administrator for Wisconsin’s insurance regulation and enforcement division. The Wisconsin insurance commissioner regulates Ambac Assurance Corp., the bond insurance unit of Ambac Financial. Mr. Ruch said that in April 1998, the state concurred with Ambac’s view that certain credit derivatives issued by an affiliate of Ambac could be considered insurance contracts that were part of the financial guaranty business.

Write to Serena Ng at serena.ng@wsj.com and Susan Pulliam at susan.pulliam@wsj.com

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120165349019826957.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

 

Pershing Square Hedge Fund Warning on Insurers Frays Nerves

Thursday, January 31st, 2008

A Warning on Insurers Frays Nerves

 

 

 

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Published: January 31, 2008

While the Federal Reserve tried to soothe Wall Street’s nerves on Wednesday, a hedge fund manager frayed them by warning that two pillars of the financial markets might crumble.

 

Letter From William A. Ackman to Regulators (pdf)

Even as the Fed delivered another big cut in interest rates, William A. Ackman, a prominent money manager, fanned growing fears that the bond insurance industry might suffer crippling losses.

Mr. Ackman, who runs a New York hedge fund called Pershing Square and has bet against the insurers’ shares, issued a report late in the afternoon predicting that two of the companies, MBIA and the Ambac Financial Group, might lose $24 billion on complex mortgage investments they have guaranteed. Such a hole might threaten their survival and touch off a chain reaction of losses at some of Wall Street’s biggest banks, as well as raise borrowing costs for states and municipalities.

His report, along with the downgrading of a smaller bond guarantor, helped quash a rally in stocks caused by the Fed’s rate cut. The Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index closed down 0.5 percent after being up by as much as 1.7 percent an hour before the close. Shares of financial services stocks fell about 1.1 percent.

“Here comes Ackman at the 11th hour upsetting the apple cart,” said Douglas M. Peta, chief market strategist at J.& W. Seligman & Company. “I don’t think anybody has really thought it all through, but we all understand the implications of real trouble in the bond insurers could be far reaching.”

Bond insurers could face more pressure today as the stock markets open. Just after midnight Thursday, MBIA reported that it lost $2.3 billion, or $18.61 a share in the fourth quarter, compared with profit of $181 million, or $1.32 a share in the quarter a year ago.

Together MBIA and Ambac guarantee more than $1 trillion in municipal, corporate and mortgage debt and carry a mark of distinction — a triple-A credit rating — a boast that even the most well-heeled of corporations like I.B.M. cannot make.

Ratings agencies like S.& P. and Moody’s Investors Service have said they are considering downgrading the insurers because the companies may not have enough capital to pay claims on future losses in the complex mortgage-related investments they have insured.

At the same time, insurance regulators hope to head off the downgradings by persuading Wall Street banks to inject capital into the companies or provide them with backup lines of credit.

Highlighting the uncertainty facing the insurers and regulators, S.& P. said on Wednesday that it had already downgraded or was considering reducing the rating on more than half a trillion dollars of mortgage securities. These are the kind of investments that MBIA and Ambac have insured and are required to make interest and principal payments on if homeowners default and their homes are sold at a loss.

For their part, MBIA and Ambac have argued that concerns about their viability, let alone their triple-A rating, are overblown. They say defaults will not be high enough that they would suffer significant losses, and even then they say the claims would be minimal and have to be paid over years, not right away.

MBIA said late Wednesday that it had secured $500 million in capital from Warburg Pincus, the private equity firm, as part of a previously announced $1 billion investment. The company also added two representatives from Warburg Pincus to its board and said an executive from Deutsche Bank would be leaving the board.

Investors in the stock market appear to have little faith in the insurers. Shares of MBIA and Ambac have plunged more than 80 percent in the last 12 months.

On Wednesday, Mr. Ackman released detailed estimates for losses on mortgage securities guaranteed by MBIA and Ambac, saying the estimates were based on conservative assumptions. He said the data, which he released online so it could be analyzed by other investors, would give lie to the companies’ assertions that they only insured safe securities.

“Now it’s a level playing field,” Mr. Ackman said in a telephone interview. “We are putting it out there and we are saying don’t rely on us. Do your own work. Here is the data that you can use.”

In a letter addressed to insurance regulators and the Securities and Exchange Commission, he said that he received details of the bonds that the two companies had insured from an unidentified “global bank.”

Mr. Ackman said the bank, which he believes also has bearish positions on the insurers, gathered the data from publicly available sources that included the companies’ financial statements and regulatory filings.

MBIA declined to comment and Ambac did not return a telephone call.

Fitch Ratings, meanwhile, downgraded another insurer, the Financial Guarantee Insurance Company, to double-A, from triple-A, after the company failed to meet a deadline to raise $1 billion in new capital. The loss of the rating will make it harder for the company to write new insurance policies.

Later in the day, S.& P. further rattled the market by issuing its warning about downgrades to mortgage securities. The move could, the rating firm acknowledged, force big losses at European and Asian banks as well as American regional banks, credit unions and the government-sponsored finance companies that have not yet written down the value of their subprime holdings to reflect market values.

The downgradings “could lead to the realization of those losses,” analysts at S.& P. said in a news release. The rating firm also said it would start to review its ratings for some banks, particularly those that “are thinly capitalized.”

For bigger banks, trouble at the bond insurers could unleash another wave of big losses. Meredith Whitney, an analyst at Oppenheimer & Company, estimates big banks may have to write down their investments by $40 billion to $70 billion if the guarantors lose their ratings. That would be on top of the more than $135 billion in write-downs they have already taken.

The latest changes in ratings and estimates of large losses will put more pressure on the New York insurance superintendent, Eric Dinallo, who is leading an effort to shore up MBIA and Ambac. This week, Mr. Dinallo hired Joseph R. Perella, a well-known investment banker, to advise him and persuade large banks to commit capital or loans to the insurers. The involvement of Mr. Perella has helped ameliorate some of the criticism of the effort among some Wall Street banks that did not have a big exposure to MBIA and Ambac, according to two people with knowledge of the talks.

Michael M. Grynbaum contributed reporting.

ackman-jan-30-2008_open-source-model.pdf

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ackman-jan-30-2008_open-source-model.pdf

Ackman Devoured 140,000 Pages Challenging MBIA Rating (Update2)
By Christine Richard and Katherine Burton

Jan. 31 (Bloomberg) — It was the $109,000 photocopying bill that hedge fund manager William Ackman says made him realize how much he’d read and underlined before betting against bond insurer MBIA Inc. in 2002.

His law firm charged him for copying 725,000 pages of financial statements and other documents, 140,000 of them about MBIA, to comply with a subpoena. Following New York and U.S. probes of his trading and reports, Ackman persisted in challenging MBIA’s AAA credit rating for more than five years, based on his own research.

Ackman may soon be proved right. MBIA, the largest provider of insurance against defaults in the global credit market, today reported a fourth-quarter net loss of $2.3 billion because of the declining value of mortgage-related securities it guaranteed. The independent research firm CreditSights Inc. this week said MBIA’s credit rating may be downgraded. Ackman had warned that MBIA was magnifying its risks by backing instruments such as those based on loans to the least creditworthy homebuyers.

“It’s in the nature of a shareholder activist to be persistent,” says Ackman, now 41. “I’ve been persistent because it’s an important issue. People are obsessive about stupid things. They are persistent about important things.”

In the MBIA documents, Ackman says he saw that the insurer was guaranteeing untested asset-backed securities. He also found a reinsurance transaction that allowed the company to downplay a loss. MBIA agreed in January 2007 to pay $75 million to settle U.S. regulators’ inquiries into that deal.

$2,000 Bet on SAT

Ackman peppered rating companies and regulators with letters, e-mails and presentations criticizing MBIA’s credit rating. He also got then-New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, who was investigating Ackman’s activities, to probe MBIA.

Shares of MBIA, based in Armonk, New York, rose $1.54, or 11 percent, to $15.50 at 4:26 p.m. in New York Stock Exchange composite trading. The stock is down 78 percent in the past year.

In high school Ackman bet his father $2,000 that he would get a perfect score on the verbal portion of the SAT college- entrance exam. He says his dad called off the wager the morning of the test for fear he would lose the bet, though Ackman ended up scoring wrong on one answer.

Betting against MBIA and the No. 2 bond insurer, New York- based Ambac Financial Group Inc., helped Ackman’s New York-based fund, Pershing Square Capital Management, to return 22 percent net to investors last year. He says he plans to give his personal gains on the bond insurers to Pershing Square’s charitable foundation.

Speaking Publicly

“He has spoken out publicly about it, approached regulators, talked to the media,” says David Einhorn, 39, head of New York-based Greenlight Capital LLC, who also has wagered against MBIA. “He’s not more right today than he was five years ago that MBIA was never AAA.”

Yesterday, in a letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission and to New York Insurance Superintendent Eric Dinallo, Ackman said MBIA and Ambac may each lose $11.6 billion on guarantees of mortgage-linked debt and other securities. He posted a list of the securities the two companies guaranteed on the Internet, along with a model supplied by an unnamed investment bank, so investors could do their own forecasts of what the insurers might lose.

In 2003, as the New York attorney general’s probe was under way, Ackman fired off a memo to MBIA posing 146 questions he says the company never answered. The first was, “Why did you have me investigated?”

`Emperor Has No Clothes’

“No one wanted to believe that a AAA-rated company was doing what it was doing,” says Roger Siefert, a forensic accountant Ackman hired in 2003. “We were treated like the little boy saying `the emperor has no clothes.”’

Chuck Chaplin, MBIA’s chief financial officer, says in an interview that Ackman’s criticism reflects misperceptions of the bond insurer’s business. He disputes Ackman’s estimates of MBIA’s losses and says the trader is benefiting more from lucky timing than smart analysis.

“He was at the right place at the right time,” Chaplin says. “The past six months turned out to be a good time to be short business sectors with mortgage-market exposure, and as it turned out, the bond insurers ended up being one of them.”

Martin Whitman, the 83-year-old chairman of New York-based Third Avenue Management LLC, dismissed Ackman’s criticism of MBIA in a December interview on CNBC.

“Mr. Ackman is a slick salesman who doesn’t know much about insurance,” Whitman said. Whitman’s firm owned more than 10 percent of MBIA’s stock, he said in the interview.

Advertising Commissions

Ackman earned undergraduate and business degrees from Harvard. His father, Lawrence Ackman, recalls that his son and another student worked one summer selling advertising for the “Let’s Go” travel guides and earned unusually high commissions of $15,000 to $20,000.

“The next year they reduced the commission rates and ruined it for all future students,” Lawrence Ackman says.

Straight out of business school, Ackman started his first hedge fund, Gotham Partners, with fellow student David Berkowitz. In the mid-1990s, Gotham tried to buy Rockefeller Center. During the talks, Ackman, then 28, says he got a call from Donald Trump.

Call From Trump

“He said to me, `Bill, Goldman Sachs is stealing Rockefeller Center and we’ve got to sit down and try to work something out,”’ Ackman says. The two never agreed to work together.

In July 1996, a group led by Goldman Sachs and David Rockefeller, the philanthropist and former chief of Chase Manhattan Corp., took control of the complex for $1.2 billion in cash and assumed debt. Gotham made a profit selling a stake in the property to Goldman, Ackman says. Trump didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Ackman took an interest in MBIA after asking a credit- market trader which companies didn’t deserve AAA ratings, he says. In a report entitled, “Is MBIA Triple-A?” he argued that the company had insufficient reserves to cover potential losses and was guaranteeing increasingly risky debts.

He disclosed taking a short position in MBIA, in which an investor sells borrowed stock, expecting to repurchase it later at a lower price and return the shares to the owner. Ackman also bought credit-default swaps, financial instruments based on bonds and loans that are used to speculate on a company’s ability to repay debt. The swaps would rise in value if doubts about MBIA grew.

Spitzer Investigation

Late in 2002, Ackman published his MBIA findings on Gotham’s Web site. Ron MacDonald, the head of reinsurance at MBIA until 1999, read the report early in 2003 and e-mailed Ackman praising it, MacDonald says.

Ackman learned in January 2003 from a Wall Street Journal reporter that Spitzer was investigating whether Gotham had engaged in manipulative trading on MBIA and other companies and that the newspaper would publish an article the next day. The SEC later started its own probe.

“This is going to be a good thing,” Ackman says he told friends that evening. “I’m going to meet Eliot Spitzer.” He says he saw it as an opportunity to turn the tables and present his concerns about MBIA.

Spitzer was investigating not only Ackman’s position in MBIA, but also his trading in two other companies, Pre-Paid Legal Services and Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corp., or Farmer Mac. Spitzer, now the New York governor, didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Turning the Tables

Ackman and Siefert, the forensic accountant, drew investigators’ attention to the reinsurance deal that led to the $75 million settlement a year ago. The transaction covered MBIA for losses related to the 1998 bankruptcy of a Pennsylvania hospital group.

Meanwhile, Ackman made a series of presentations to Moody’s Investors Service Inc., the New York-based credit rating company, challenging the bond insurer’s top credit grade. In 2005, he wrote to Moody’s warning that it was risking its own credibility by keeping MBIA at AAA.

“I apologize for putting you and Moody’s on the spot,” Ackman wrote. “I have simply lost patience, and it is 2 in the morning.” A Moody’s spokesman said no one was available to comment.

Ackman says he recently received notification that the SEC had ended its investigation of him without any finding of wrongdoing. The letter arrived only after he wrote to the SEC chairman and the agency’s four commissioners demanding it.

To contact the reporters on this story: Christine Richard in New York at crichard5@bloomberg.net ; Katherine Burton in New York at kburton@bloomberg.net ;

Last Updated: January 31, 2008 18:45 EST

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=a5tQL4.YXs8I&refer=exclusive

Mastering the Informational Interview

Thursday, January 31st, 2008

Mastering the Informational Interview

Informational interviews can be a useful tool throughout your career, not just when you’re thinking about a new job or a new line of work. You can do informational interviews when you want to learn more about a certain career move or even what it would feel like to get involved in a new project like writing a book, starting a blog, or running your own company.

In November, I did a post about informational interviews, and since then a few readers have told me they wanted more on this subject. In the original post, I focused on some of my pet peeves about informational interviews. But I should have also offered suggestions on how to get the most out of them, and that is what I will do today.

Finding people to interview can happen in a variety of ways. You can ask friends and colleagues to make introductions. You can find people through an alumni network or a social networking site like LinkedIn.

Once you have found people to approach, you’ll need to contact them to see if they are interested in having a brief meeting or phone call. If someone rebuffs you at this stage, give up and try some other contacts. If a person is receptive, set up a meeting, keeping these few thoughts in mind:

1. The other person is doing you a favor, so it should be about what’s convenient for the interviewer, not you. Follow his or her lead as to whether meetings will be in person or by phone.
2. These meetings are not about asking for job leads; the point is to learn something.
3. Think about informational interviews as a way to build a relationship and expand your network, not as a way to get a job.
4. Wait for the right time. So often we get a number and feel as if we should call immediately. But if you’re not ready, you may bungle a meeting. Why wouldn’t you be ready? When you’re overextended and it’s hard to find time on your calendar or if you haven’t done enough research about the industry or the company where the person works.
5. Don’t overstay your welcome. It’s always better to signal the meeting is ending and let the other person say he or she is open to continuing the discussion.

Finally, how do you make the most of these meetings? People who are successful at something (the reason you’re approaching them) are often pressed for time. So be respectful. Ask how much time the person has. But it’s safe to assume that a 20-minute phone call or a 30-minute meeting is a reasonable request. Before the meeting, do your homework. Try to find out a bit about the person you’re meeting. What’s going on in his or her company or industry? Do a Google search and if you have some time in advance, set up a Google news alert so that you don’t miss big developments. And you should also know what you want. Don’t expect the other person to set the agenda.

Finally, here are some questions you may want to consider:

1. Can you tell me how you got to this position?
2. What do you like most about what you do, and what would you change if you could?
3. How do people break into this field?
4. What are the types of jobs that exist where you work and in the industry in general?
5. Where would you suggest a person investigate if the person were particularly skilled at (fill in the blank — quantitative thinking, communications, writing, advocacy)?
6. What does a typical career path look like in your industry?
7. What are some of the biggest challenges facing your company and your industry today?
8. Are there any professional or trade associations I should connect with?
9. What do you read — in print and online — to keep up with developments in your field?
10. How do you see your industry changing in the next 10 years?
11. If you were just getting involved now, where would you put yourself?
12. What’s a typical day like for you?
13. What’s unique or differentiating about your company?
14. How has writing a book (starting a blog, running a company, etc.) differed from your expectations? What have been the greatest moments and biggest challenges?

After the meeting, make sure to follow up. If you said you’d send an article, contact someone or do something, make sure to do what you said you would. If you want to continue the relationship, figure out how to stay in touch. If there was no chemistry, move on.

Updated Jan 29, 11:03 A.M.
As an astute reader pointed out, I neglected to mention one very important aspect of follow-up. Make sure to properly give thanks, either by an e-mail or handwritten note.