The credit-default swap needs reform, not abolition
FINANCIAL innovations tend to go through four phases. At first, they are hailed as proof of the brilliance of the bankers who devised them. Then they succumb to rampant speculation, as investors try to exploit them. And that leads to revulsion, as a crisis causes widespread losses. The question is: should the fourth phase be rejection or rehabilitation?
The latest innovation to pass through the cycle is the credit-default swap or CDS. Despite its forbidding name, the CDS is a simple idea: it allows an investor to buy insurance against a company defaulting on its debt payments. When it was invented, the CDS was a useful concept because more people felt comfortable owning corporate debt if they could eliminate the risk of the issuer failing. The extra appetite for debt helped lower the cost of capital.
But any insurance contract requires someone to take the other side of the bargain, and that person will often be a speculator. Even a dull-sounding insurance company that sells you fire cover is in effect speculating that your house will not burn down. Insurers have lots of historical data to fall back on when setting their premiums—and even then many have gone bust in the past. Sellers of CDSs had no such record to consult. Indeed the past has been no guide to the future of CDSs, because the corporate-debt market has been transformed over the past 20 years as investors have chased yield by lending to less creditworthy borrowers.
As with previous innovations, speculation on the health of companies soon swamped the need for insurance that was the market’s original purpose. CDS contracts were worth $62 trillion at the peak, far more than the bonds the CDSs were insuring. Companies like AIG, a giant American insurer, wrote far too many contracts. Wild swings in the cost of bond insurance may have helped hasten the demise of investment banks like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers because they found it harder to raise new capital in the teeth of the crisis. When Lehman failed it looked as if the market was unsafe: Lehman not only issued its own debt (the basis for lots of Lehman CDSs), but it was also an important dealer in those of other companies—party to perhaps 7-10% of all the trades in the market.
Plenty of people (including the New York insurance commissioner) have concluded that the fourth phase for CDSs is now obvious: rejection. They want the market to meet tight new regulations, such as requiring that any buyer of a CDS should have an interest in the underlying bond.
In fact, rehabilitation makes more sense. With a bit of nudging, the market is reforming itself. At the moment, trades are settled directly, leaving participants exposed to the failure of the other party. A central clearing house would have reduced the damage of Lehman’s collapse by around two-thirds, according to a report by Moody’s, the ratings agency.
Even without a clearing house, the market survived both the demise of Lehman and the earlier (largely technical) default of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two housing giants. The potentially complex procedure for settling the trades worked, without wrecking other firms; Moody’s reckons the Lehman-related losses were widely spread. If banks and investors learn anything from the crisis, it is that they will make sure the firms they deal with can meet their side of the bargain.
A Betty Ford clinic for derivatives
Doubtless, the CDS market has caused immense problems, largely because no one was sure of the extent of investors’ exposure. Had AIG as well as Lehman gone bust, the market might have collapsed. The failure of another big bank would still put the system under strain, but the CDS market would not be alone. And remember that the default of big bond issuers disrupted the system long before anybody had thought of inventing the CDS.
Every bubble sees excesses; it seems odd to single out the CDS. Think back to the crash of 1987 when fingers pointed at the equity-futures market, which institutions were using to protect against falls in their share portfolios. It was argued that this exacerbated the crash. A commission was established; restrictions were imposed. Twenty years later, the Chicago equity futures and options market is vast: some $45 trillion of contracts traded on the S&P 500 index alone last year compared with the total American stockmarket value of just $10 trillion. But equity futures are unnoticed and unblamed in the crisis.
In 20 years the CDS may well be as little remarked as the equity future is now. But only with reform. As well as a clearing house, the market must be more transparent. Banks and other quoted firms should reveal how exposed they are to the market. CDSs have their uses. There is no reason why investors should not speculate in corporate debt if they can speculate on equities, currencies, commodities and the rest.
Published: November 3 2008 20:33 | Last updated: November 3 2008 20:33
The European Central Bank and eurozone central banks on Monday threw their support behind “at least one European solution” for the creation of a central clearing house for over-the-counter credit default swaps.
The statement came after the ECB held a meeting with exchanges and clearers, including Eurex, the derivatives arm of Deutsche Börse and LCH.Clearnet, Europe’s largest independent clearer.
Insight: Why credit derivatives need a clearing house - Oct-16
“Participants at the meeting underlined the merits of multiple solutions in general and of at least one European solution. The Eurosystem stands ready, in co-operation with the other authorities, to facilitate the effective collective action of the private sector in this regard,” an ECB statement said.
Efforts to come up with a solution for providing a clearing system for the CDS market are more advanced in the US. They involve four groups: the Intercontinental Exchange, the US-based electronic futures exchange; the CME Group, the world’s largest futures exchange; Liffe, the derivatives arm of NYSE Euronext; and Eurex.
On Friday, US regulators said they were “hopeful” that at least one of the groups vying to provide centralised clearing for the credit derivatives market will begin operations before the end of the year.
European regulators and policymakers have recently grown concerned that there should also be centralised clearing in Europe so that the market is not left with one solution in the US.
That is because they are not convinced that European regulators would have the ability to intervene in a situation where a US clearing house ran into difficulties, given that the clearing house would be subject to US jurisdiction.
The ECB said its meeting “complemented initiatives” by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and European Commission.
Thomas Book, member of Eurex’s executive board responsible for clearing, said: “We welcome the expressed need for at least one European solution because of the importance of European credit derivatives markets.”
Regulators looked the other way while credit default swaps grew into a $60 trillion threat to the world’s financial system. Now the CDS market is getting plenty of attention, and brawling has broken out over how to regulate it and who should oversee the job.
Enticed by what promises to be a lucrative business, clearing companies and exchanges are vying to establish trading platforms. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commissionand the Federal Reserve Bank of New York are claiming the right to be the primary regulator of derivative securities. And various congressional committees are bickering over which will have jurisdiction to oversee the market and the agency eventually assigned to supervise it.
Already, three federal agencies and one state agency have different ideas for how the market for credit default swaps should be regulated. Meanwhile, congressional finance, banking and agriculture committees that oversee the regulators are also jockeying for position. There appears to be agreement that the market should not operate without added oversight, but disagreement is wide over how to structure a market for CDSs and how direct the government’s oversight should be.
Businesses trying to establish the new market include CME Group Inc.; NYSE Euronext Inc.; IntercontinentalExchange Inc. or ICE; Eurex, the derivatives arm of Deutsche Börse AG; and Knight Capital Group Inc. Futures giant CME, with hedge fund Citadel Investment Group LLC, is offering to create a platform that would clear trading of credit default swaps by matching buyers and sellers, guaranteeing that both would have the financial strength to stand behind their trades. Then, on Oct. 30, ICE announced it agreed to acquire the Clearing Corp. and signed agreements with nine banks, bolstering its position to establish its trading platform.
Initially, it looks like Ben Bernanke’s Federal Reserve will oversee the nascent trading platform. According to ICE officials speaking on a conference call last week, the exchange sought to design a clearing model for CDSs that would be subject to Fed oversight, since the central bank was taking a pre-eminent role in addressing the credit crisis.
The Fed wants details on how CDSs would be settled by a clearinghouse, how trades would be processed, what safeguards exist if a trader or a dealer defaults and how the system will protect against a financial crisis.
But the SEC also wants to regulate CDSs, as does the CFTC. It’s unclear whether the Fed will maintain its oversight or whether it will eventually hand it off to one of the other agencies.
The Commodities Futures Modernization Act barred the CFTC from regulating most swap products in 2000. During the swaps explosion, neither the CFTC nor the SEC were willing to buck the Bush administration’s deregulation policies. With markets in disarray, both are fighting for the right to preside over swaps. The CFTC says they’re futures contracts and thus are under its jurisdiction. The SEC says they’re financial instruments with no connection to agriculture or raw materials futures.
Despite the SEC’s recent abysmal performance, Chairman Christopher Cox has said the agency is prepared to regulate swaps with the same authority it has over stocks and bonds. The CFTC may argue that at least one industry proposal for a new platform for settling swap contracts would give it top duties.
Walter Lukken, the CFTC’s acting commissioner, told lawmakers at an Oct. 14 hearing that current law exempts swaps from regulation and that “wholesale regulatory reform will require careful consideration.” He should know — Lukken helped craft the law barring the CFTC from regulating most swap products when he was a Republican congressional staffer. Enron Corp., the biggest energy derivative merchant in the U.S. at the time, lobbied heavily for the exemption, which was sponsored by then-Sen. Phil Gramm, R-Texas. Now Lukken is conceding that some regulatory structure is necessary.
Congress could simply merge the SEC with the CFTC. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson proposed such a step in March, saying a single securities and futures regulator would better reflect how deeply entrenched Wall Street is in many markets. And before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform last week, Cox said he “strongly supports” a merger.
New York state has moved recently to regulate some CDS contracts because of their insurance component, proposing that the seller may have to be licensed as an insurer in New York.
The outcome of the turf war will have practical implications for how the platform will work. The CFTC and the New York Fed favor a less regimented clearinghouse platform; the SEC wants a more formal exchange.
The clearinghouse would charge a fee and act as an intermediary that would guarantee transactions between swaps traders. To make those guarantees, the clearinghouse would require traders to maintain sufficient capital in their accounts. That would make it hard to trade without the money to cover a contract in case of default.
Working with the New York Fed is the ICE, which plans to set up in New York under Fed authority. Some of the country’s biggest banks, including Goldman, Sachs & Co. and Morgan Stanley, established ICE. In June it bought Creditex Group Inc., which executes and processes swaps in the U.S., Europe and Asia. Creditex and subsidiary Markit Group Ltd. recently liquidated swaps of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. That could give it a leg up in the battle.
CME Group and hedge fund Citadel would not only trade CDSs on a new platform but also use CME’s clearinghouse to clear swaps. CME would get involved as counterparty in every CDS trade and manage the credit exposures from the time the trade is made to when the trade is officially settled. The CFTC now oversees its operation.
NYSE Euronext London-based subsidiary Liffe also plans to process and clear swaps. The service, announced in July and called Bclear, now clears equity derivatives trades and would remove counterparty risk by using LCH.Clearnet Group Ltd. as a central counterparty to all the CDS contracts it processes.
If Congress grants the SEC power to oversee swaps, the agency could set up several exchanges, similar to the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq.
Stephen Figlewski, a professor of finance at New York University’s Stern School of Business, wrote in a recent paper that the over-the-counter CDS market needs such an exchange. Clearinghouses “are too fragile, too loosely regulated and too opaque,” he wrote.
There’s been resistance: An exchange would reduce the ability to customize CDS contracts, reducing their profitability. “Trading CDSs on an exchange will make them much more standardized,” says Howard Spilko, a partner at Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP in New York. Spilko adds that CDSs have specialized terms that go with them that counterparties need to negotiate. “They’re not plain vanilla.”
CDSs were toxic partly because they were traded and retraded past the point of knowing who the original sellers were and their value. That uncertainty had a snowball effect with each failure. The use of an exchange provides a middleman for each transaction, so the buyer and seller are identified. If there is a problem, fallout is limited. Swaps would be marked to market each day.
Dealers also fret that their lucrative business will be transformed, with exchanges not only executing but designing their own products. “Exchanges are not just a utility anymore, they’re a competitor,” says Ron Paul, a former general counsel to the CFTC now with DLA Piper’s alternative asset management team in New York.
It’s doubtful, however, that one platform or exchange will be the sole recipient of so much business. Competition should make it less expensive for parties to trade. What will be more telling is whether the desire to concentrate liquidity and have a deep pocket will necessitate one platform winning out over other exchanges and dealers. Whichever company is picked must offer what thus far has been absent in the market for CDSs: transparency and more efficient risk management.
Much depends on how Congress settles its own jurisdictional squabbles. The turf fights among congressional committees with a claim to jurisdiction will be fierce. Authority over a giant new trading platform will bring presiding lawmakers not only power, but offer a new source of campaign contributions from the financial industry. “It’s a minefield,” says one former agency official who would not be identified. “Even if Congress decides they want to do something … it becomes a power play among the committees as to who will continue to get Wall Street support.”
One industry expert is wary of any congressional mandate regulating CDSs, saying a global regulator is needed. “We need a global structure, a modern coherent regulatory regime; otherwise, you’ll have a patchwork of regulation.”
Steve Kroft On Credit Default Swaps And Their Central Role In The Unfolding Economic Crisis
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Oct. 26, 2008
(iStockphoto)
Credit Default Swaps
Steve Kroft examines the complicated financial instruments known as credit default swaps and the central role they are playing in the unfolding economic crisis. | Share/Embed
(CBS) The world’s financial system teetered on the edge again last week, and anyone with more than a passing interest in their shrinking 401(k) knows it’s because of a global credit crisis. It began with the collapse of the U.S. housing market and has been magnified worldwide by what Warren Buffet once called “financial weapons of mass destruction.”
They are called credit derivatives or credit default swaps, and 60 Minutes did a story on the multi-trillion dollar market three weeks ago. But there’s a lot more to tell.
As Steve Kroft reports, essentially they are side bets on the performance of the U.S. mortgage markets and the solvency on some of the biggest financial institutions in the world. It’s a form of legalized gambling that allows you to wager on financial outcomes without ever having to actually buy the stocks and bonds and mortgages.
It would have been illegal during most of the 20th century, but eight years ago Congress gave Wall Street an exemption and it has turned out to be a very bad idea.
While Congress and the rest of the country scratched their heads trying to figure out how we got into this mess, 60 Minutes decided to go to Frank Partnoy, a law professor at the University of San Diego, who has written a couple of books on the subject.
Ask to explain what a derivative is, Partnoy says, “A derivative is a financial instrument whose value is based on something else. It’s basically a side bet.”
Think of it for a moment as a football game. Every week, the New York Giants take the field with hopes of getting back to the Super Bowl. If they do, they will get more money and glory for the team and its owners. They have a direct investment in the game. But the people in the stands may also have a financial stake in the ouctome, in the form of a bet with a friend or a bookie.
“We could call that a derivative. It’s a side bet. We don’t own the teams. But we have a bet based on the outcome. And a lot of derivatives are bets based on the outcome of games of a sort. Not football games, but games in the markets,” Partnoy explains.
Partnoy says the bet was whether interest rates were going to go up or down. “And the new bet that arose over the last several years is a bet based on whether people will default on their mortgages.”
And that was the bet that blew up Wall Street. The TNT was the collapse of the housing market and the failure of complicated mortgage securities that the big investment houses created and sold around the world.
But the rocket fuel was the trillions of dollars in side bets on those mortgage securities, called “credit default swaps.” They were essentially private insurance contracts that paid off if the investment went bad, but you didn’t have to actually own the investment to collect on the insurance.
“If I thought certain mortgage securities were gonna fail, I could go out and buy insurance on them without actually owning them?” Kroft asks Eric Dinallo, the insurance superintendent for the state of New York.
“Yeah,” Dinallo says. “The irony is, though, you’re not really buying insurance at that point. You’re just placing the bet.”
Dinallo says credit default swaps were totally unregulated and that the big banks and investment houses that sold them didn’t have to set aside any money to cover their potential losses and pay off their bets.
“As the market began to seize up and as the market for the underlying obligations began to perform poorly, everybody wanted to get paid, had a right to get paid on those credit default swaps. And there was no ‘there’ there. There was no money behind the commitments. And people came up short. And so that’s to a large extent what happened to Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, and the holding company of AIG,” he explains.
In other words, three of the nation’s largest financial institutions had made more bad bets than they could afford to pay off. Bear Stearns was sold to J.P. Morgan for pennies on the dollar, Lehman Brothers was allowed to go belly up, and AIG, considered too big to let fail, is on life support to thanks to a $123 billion investment by U.S. taxpayers.
“It’s legalized gambling. It was illegal gambling. And we made it legal gambling…with absolutely no regulatory controls. Zero, as far as I can tell,” Dinallo says.
“I mean it sounds a little like a bookie operation,” Kroft comments.
“Yes, and it used to be illegal. It was very illegal 100 years ago,” Dinallo says.
(CBS) In the early part of the 20th century, the streets of New York and other large cities were lined with gaming establishments called “bucket shops,” where people could place wagers on whether the price of stocks would go up or down without actually buying them. This unfettered speculation contributed to the panic and stock market crash of 1907, and state laws all over the country were enacted to ban them.
“Big headlines, huge type. This is the front page of the New York Times,” Dinallo explains, holding up a headline that reads “No bucket shops for new law to hit.”
“So they’d already closed up ’cause the law was coming. Here’s a picture of one of them. And they were like parlors. See,” Dinallo says. “Betting parlors. It was a felony. Well, it was a felony when a law came into effect because it had brought down the market in 1907. And they said, ‘We’re not gonna let this happen again.’ And then 100 years later in 2000, we rolled them all back.”
The vehicle for doing this was an obscure but critical piece of federal legislation called the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. And the bill was a big favorite of the financial industry it would eventually help destroy.
It not only removed derivatives and credit default swaps from the purview of federal oversight, on page 262 of the legislation, Congress pre-empted the states from enforcing existing gambling and bucket shop laws against Wall Street.
“It makes it sound like they knew it was illegal,” Kroft remarks.
“I would agree,” Dinallo says. “They did know it was illegal. Or at least prosecutable.”
In retrospect, giving Wall Street immunity from state gambling laws and legalizing activity that had been banned for most of the 20th century should have given lawmakers pause, but on the last day and the last vote of the lame duck 106th Congress, Wall Street got what it wanted when the Senate passed the bill unanimously.
“There was an awful lot of, ‘Trust us. Leave it alone. We can do it better than government,’ without any realistic understanding of the dangers involved,” says Harvey Goldschmid, a Columbia University law professor and a former commissioner and general counsel of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
He says the bill was passed at the height of Wall Street and Washington’s love affair with deregulation, an infatuation that was endorsed by President Clinton at the White House and encouraged by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan.
“That was the wildest and silliest period in many ways. Now, again, that’s with hindsight because the argument at the time was these are grownups. They’re institutions with a great deal of money. Government will only get in the way. Fears it will be taken overseas. Leave it alone. But it was a wrong-headed argument. And turned out to be, of course, extraordinarily unwise,” Goldschmid says.
(CBS) Asked what role Greenspan played in all of this, Professor Goldschmid says, “Well, he made clear in his public speeches and book that a Libertarian drive was part of the way he looked at the world. He’s a very talented man. But that didn’t take us where we had to be.”
“Alan was the most powerful man in Washington in a real sense. Certainly a rival to the president and had enormous influence on Capitol Hill,” Goldschmid says,
“And he was at the height of his power,” Kroft adds.
Within eight years, unregulated derivatives and swaps helped produce the largest financial services economy the United States has ever had. Estimates of the market for credit default swaps grew from $100 billion to more than $50 trillion, and you could bet on anything from the solvency of communities to the fate of General Motors.
It also produced a huge transfer of private wealth to Wall Street traders and investment bankers, who collected billions of dollars in bonuses. A lot of the money was made financing what seemed to be a never-ending housing boom, selling mortgage securities they thought were safe and credit default swaps that would never have to be paid off.
“The credit default swaps was the key of what went wrong and what’s created these enormous losses,” Goldschmid says.
“Is it your impression that people at the big Wall Street investment houses knew what was going on and knew the kind of risks that they were exposed to?” Kroft asks.
“No. My impression is to the contrary, that even at senior levels they only vaguely understood the risks. They only vaguely followed what was going on,” Goldschmid says. “And when it tumbled, there was some genuine surprise not only at the board level where there wasn’t enough oversight but at senior management level.”
They didn’t know what was going on in part because credit default swaps were totally unregulated. No one knew how many there were or who owned them. There was no central exchange or clearing house to keep track of all the bets and to hold the money to make sure they got paid off. Eventually, savvy investors figured out that the cheapest, most effective way to bet against the entire housing market was to buy credit defaults swaps, in effect taking out inexpensive insurance policies that would pay off big when other people’s mortgage investments went south.
(CBS) “I know people personally who have taken away more than $1 billion from having been on the right side of these transactions,” says Jim Grant, publisher of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer and one of the country’s foremost experts on credit markets.
“If you can and you could lay down cents on the dollar to place a bet on the solvency of Wall Street, for example, as some did, when Wall Street became evidently insolvent, that cents on the dollar bet went up 30, 40, and 50 fold. Not everyone who did that wants to get his name in the paper. But there are some spectacularly rich people who came out of this,” Grant says.
“Who got richer,” Kroft remarks.
“Who got richer, who became, you know, fantastically richer,” Grant says.
A lot of them were hedge fund managers. John Paulson’s Credit Opportunities Fund returned almost 600 percent last year, with Paulson pocketing a reported $3.7 billion.
Bill Ackman, of Pershing Square Capital Management, said he plans to make hundreds of millions. Both declined 60 Minutes’ request for an interview.
Congress now seems shocked and outraged by the consequences of its decision eight years ago to effectively deregulate swaps and derivatives. Various members of the House and Senate have hauled in the usual suspects to accept or share the blame.
“Were you wrong?” Rep. Henry Waxman asked former Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan.
“Credit default swaps, I think, have some serious problems with them,” Greenspan replied.
It appears to be the first step in a long process of restoring at least some of the regulations and safeguards that might have prevented, or at least mitigated this disaster after the damage has already been done.
Where do we go from here?
“We need the most dramatic rethinking of the regulatory scheme for financial markets since the New Deal. If anything has demonstrated that imperative, it’s the economy right now and the tragic circumstances we’re in,” Goldschmid says.
Asked how much danger he thinks is still out there, Goldschmid says, “We don’t know. Part of the problem of the lack of transparency in these - in these markets has been we don’t really know.”
SEC head calls for transparency on credit default swap
Sat Oct 18, 2008 9:07pm EDT
NEW YORK (Reuters) - SEC Chairman Christopher Cox has called on Congress to pass legislation that would make so-called credit default swaps more transparent, including requiring that dealers in over-the-counter swaps publicly report their trades and the trades’ value.
Writing in Sunday’s New York Times, Cox noted that the $55 trillion credit defaults market is more than the GNP of all the world’s nations combined, and that credit default swaps “play an important role in the smooth functioning of capital markets.”
But, he said, “our markets function best when they are highly transparent,” while credit default swaps have “operated in the shadows,” with “no public discourse nor any legal requirement for these contracts to be reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission or any other agency.”
Having been bought and sold widely and in many cases anonymously,” trapping large financial institutions “in a web of transactions,” the swaps market has left government regulators with “no way to assess how much risk is in the system.”
“All investors … are paying a price today for the lack of oversight” of credit default swaps, which Cox describes as being “like insurance contracts on bonds and any other assets that are meant to pay off if those assets default,” he stated.
Noting the market for credit default swaps has doubled in just the past two years alone and that “private counterparty discipline has proven inadequate,” Cox proffers several suggestions:
Congress should pass legislation to increase the swaps’ transparency and give regulators “the power to rein in fraudulent or manipulative trading practices and help everyone better assess the risks involved.”
It should also require dealers to report over-the-counter swaps and their value publicly, he wrote, while the SEC “should be given explicit authority to issue rules against fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts and practices in credit default swaps.”
Lastly, he posits that Congress could provide support for federal regulators “to mandate the use of one or more central counterparties — financially stable clearance and settlement organizations — and exchange-like trading platforms for the credit-default swaps market.”
The SEC, he said, is “working with the Federal Reserve, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission and industry participants to accomplish these goals on a voluntary basis, using the authority we already have.”
But “we will need to work closely with governments in other major markets,” Cox warns.
He concluded that giving regulators authority “to bring the credit derivatives market into the sunshine” would constitute a “giant step forwarding in protecting our financial system and the well-being of every American.”
Christopher Cox, chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, March 11, …. The supervisory program under Mr. Cox, who arrived at the agency a year …October 3, 2008 - By STEPHEN LABATON - Business
Mr. Cox’s statement on Friday, however, went beyond that by blaming a specific … The program Mr. Cox abolished was unanimously approved in 2004 by the …September 27, 2008 - By STEPHEN LABATON - Business
THE historic volatility in the financial markets has raised important questions about the lack of meaningful regulation of financial instruments known as credit-default swaps. The $85 billion government rescue last month of the insurance conglomerate American International Group, for example, was needed in large part to protect those who held A.I.G.’s credit-default swaps and risked crushing losses if those instruments weren’t honored.
A.I.G. had issued $440 billion in credit-default swaps — which are like insurance contracts on bonds and other assets that are meant to pay off if those assets default. But as markdowns on A.I.G.’s investments in subprime mortgages led to downgrades in its credit ratings, the holders of the credit-default swaps demanded more collateral, which A.I.G. could not provide.
As large as A.I.G.’s swaps exposure was, it represented only 0.8 percent of the $55 trillion in credit-default swaps outstanding — this total market is more than the gross domestic product of all nations on earth combined.
Yet despite its enormous size, the credit-default swaps market has operated in the shadows. There is no public disclosure nor any legal requirement for these contracts to be reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission or any other agency. So government regulators have had no way to assess how much risk is in the system, whether credit-default swaps have been accurately valued or honestly traded, and when people issuing and trading them have taken on risk that threatens others.
Because these instruments have been bought and sold widely and in many cases anonymously, they have trapped the large financial institutions in a web of transactions. This has created systemic risk that is particularly serious in the current stressful economic environment, contributing to a gravitational pull that stands to drag everyone down.
All investors — from individuals through their 401(k) plans to pension funds and asset managers — are paying a price today for the lack of oversight. We must urgently address the problems created by this unregulated environment.
Credit-default swaps are not inherently good or evil. They play an important role in the smooth functioning of capital markets by allowing a broad range of institutional investors to manage the credit risks to which they are exposed. They are also a useful means for investors to signal their view of an entity’s business prospects and creditworthiness.
But our markets function best when they are highly transparent, when everyone can see exactly which transactions are occurring and what the instruments being traded are worth. This gives investors confidence that they can accurately assess risk.
Back in 2000, Congress specifically decided not to regulate credit-default swaps. At that time, this market was just a few years old and still very small. For example, in 1999 a report by the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets envisioned no systemic risk from such derivatives since “private counterparty discipline” — investors’ natural desire to keep their own risks to a minimum — would work to protect the broader financial system.
But the market for credit-default swaps has recently mushroomed. In just the past two years, it has doubled in size. And as the market has grown, private counterparty discipline has proven inadequate. As we have seen, individual market participants did not pay enough attention until it was too late.
To place a value on credit-default swaps and the mortgage-related securities they insure, buyers and sellers of swaps relied too heavily on financial models that couldn’t predict the mortgage market meltdown. They also trusted too much in the credit ratings of the securities and of the firms selling the credit-default swaps, and these ratings underestimated the risk.
Congress needs to fill this regulatory hole by passing legislation that would not only make credit-default swaps more transparent but also give regulators the power to rein in fraudulent or manipulative trading practices and help everyone better assess the risks involved.
Congress could require that dealers in over-the-counter credit-default swaps publicly report both their trades and the value of those trades. This would make the market more transparent, and make it easier for everyone engaged in credit-default swaps to assess their value. It would also provide regulators with the information they need to uncover unfair or fraudulent practices and to monitor risk.
Then, the Securities and Exchange Commission should be given explicit authority to issue rules against fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts and practices in credit-default swaps.
Finally, Congress could provide support for federal regulators to mandate the use of one or more central counterparties — financially stable clearance and settlement organizations — and exchange-like trading platforms for the credit-default swaps market. As it is now, it is often impossible even to know who stands on the other side of a swap contract, and this increases the risk involved. We at the S.E.C. are already working with the Federal Reserve, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and industry participants to accomplish these goals on a voluntary basis, using the authority we currently have.
Because of the truly global nature of the over-the-counter derivatives market, we will need to work closely with governments in other major markets. The climate for such cooperation is good, because the cross-border impacts of the current market problems are obvious to all.
Transparency is a powerful antidote for what ails our capital markets. When investors have clear and accurate information, and when they can make informed decisions about where to put their resources, money and credit will begin to flow again. By giving regulators the authority they need to bring the credit derivatives market into the sunshine, we can take a giant step forward in protecting our financial system and the well-being of every American.
Christopher Cox is the chairman of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.
Few Americans have heard of credit default swaps, arcane financial instruments invented by Wall Street about a decade ago. But if the economy keeps slowing, credit default swaps, like subprime mortgages, may become a household term.
Credit default swaps form a large but obscure market that will be put to its first big test as a looming economic downturn strains companies’ finances. Like a homeowner’s policy that insures against a flood or fire, these instruments are intended to cover losses to banks and bondholders when companies fail to pay their debts.
The market for these securities is enormous. Since 2000, it has ballooned from $900 billion to more than $45.5 trillion — roughly twice the size of the entire United States stock market.
No one knows how troubled the credit swaps market is, because, like the now-distressed market for subprime mortgage securities, it is unregulated. But because swaps have proliferated so rapidly, experts say that a hiccup in this market could set off a chain reaction of losses at financial institutions, making it even harder for borrowers to get loans that grease economic activity.
It is entirely possible that this market can withstand a big jump in corporate defaults, if it comes. But an inkling of trouble emerged in a recent report from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, a federal banking regulator. It warned that a significant increase in trading in swaps during the third quarter of last year “put a strain on processing systems” used by banks to handle these trades and make sure they match up.
And last week, the American International Group said that it had incorrectly valued some of the swaps it had written and that sharp declines in some of these instruments had translated to $3.6 billion more in losses than the company had previously estimated. Its stock dropped 12 percent on the news but edged up in the days after.
A.I.G. says it expects to file its year-end financial statements on time by the end of this month with appropriate valuations.
Placing accurate values on these contracts is just one of the uncertainties facing the big banks, insurance companies and hedge funds that create and trade these instruments.
In a credit default swap, two parties enter a private contract in which the buyer of protection agrees to pay the seller premiums over a set period of time; the seller pays only if a particular credit crisis occurs, like a default. These instruments can be sold, on either end of the contract, by the insurer or the insured.
But during the credit market upheaval in August, 14 percent of trades in these contracts were unconfirmed, meaning one of the parties in the resale transaction was unidentified in trade documents and remained unknown 30 days later. In December, that number stood at 13 percent. Because these trades are unregulated, there is no requirement that all parties to a contract be told when it is sold.
As investors who have purchased such swaps try to cash them in, they may have trouble tracking down who is supposed to pay their claims.
“This is just a giant insurance industry that is underregulated and not very well reserved for and does not have very good standards as a result,” said Michael A. J. Farrell, chief executive of Annaly Capital Management in New York. “I think unregulated markets that overshadow, in terms of size, the regulated ones are a real question mark.”
Because these contracts are sold and resold among financial institutions, an original buyer may not know that a new, potentially weaker entity has taken over the obligation to pay a claim.
In late 2005, at the urging of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, market participants agreed to advise their trading partners in a swap when they assigned contracts to others. But it is unclear how closely participants adhere to this practice.
It would be as if homeowners, facing losses after a hurricane, could not identify the insurance companies to pay on their claims. Or, if they could, they discovered that their insurer had transferred the policy to another company that could not cover the claim.
Credit default swaps were invented by major banks in the mid-1990s as a way to offset risk in their lending or bond portfolios. At the outset, each contract was different, volume in the market was small and participants knew whom they were dealing with.
Arcane Market Is Next to Face Big Credit Test
Published: February 17, 2008
(Page 2 of 3)
Years of a healthy economy and few corporate defaults led many banks to write more credit insurance, finding it a low-risk way to earn income because failures were few. Speculators have also flooded into the credit insurance market recently because these securities make it easier to bet on the health of a company than using corporate bonds.
Both factors have resulted in a market of credit swaps that now far exceeds the face value of corporate bonds underlying it.Commercial banks are among the biggest participants — at the end of the third quarter of 2007, the top 25 banks held credit default swaps, both as insurers and insured, worth $14 trillion, the currency office said, up $2 trillion from the previous quarter.
JPMorgan Chase, with $7.8 trillion, is the largest player; Citibank and Bank of America are behind it with $3 trillion and $1.6 trillion respectively.
But many speculators, particularly hedge funds, have flocked to these instruments to bet on a company failure easily. Before the insurance was developed, such a bet would require selling short a corporation’s bond and going into the market to borrow it to supply to the buyer.
The market’s popularity raises the possibility that undercapitalized participants could have trouble paying their obligations.
“The theme had been that derivatives are an instrument that helps diversify risk and stabilize risk-taking,” said Henry Kaufman, the economist at Henry Kaufman & Company in New York and an authority on the ways of Wall Street. “My own view of that has always been highly questionable — those instruments also encourage significant risk-taking and looking at risk modestly rather than incisively.”
Officials at the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, a trade group, say they are confident that the market will stand up, even under stress.
“During the volatility we have seen in the last eight months, credit default swaps continue to trade, unlike other parts of the credit market that have shut down,” said Robert G. Pickel, chief executive of the association. “Even if we have a series of credit events at the same time, we have the processes in place to enable the market to deliver.”
Such credit problems have been rare recently. The default rate among high-yield junk bonds fell to 0.9 percent in December, a record low.
But financial history is rife with examples of market breakdowns that followed the creation of complex securities. Financial innovation often gets ahead of the mechanics necessary to track trades or regulators’ ability to monitor the market for safety and soundness.
The market for default insurance, like the subprime mortgage securities market, is a product of good economic times and has boomed in recent years. In 2000, $900 billion of credit insurance contracts changed hands. Since then, the face value of the contracts outstanding has doubled every year as new contracts have been written. In the first six months of 2007, the figure rose 75 percent; the market now dwarfs the value of United States Treasuries outstanding.
Roughly one-third of the credit default swaps provided insurance against a default by a specific corporate debt issuer in 2006, according to the British Bankers’ Association. Around 30 percent of the contracts were written against indexes representing baskets of debt from numerous issuers.
But 16 percent were created to protect holders of collateralized debt obligations, complex pools of bonds that have recently experienced problems because of mortgage holdings.
There is no exchange where these insurance contracts trade, and their prices are not reported to the public. Because of this, institutions typically value them based on computer models rather than prices set by the market.
Neither are the participants overseen by regulators verifying that the parties to the transactions can meet their obligations.
The potential for problems in sizing up the financial health of buyers of these securities leads to questions about how these insurance contracts are being valued on banks’ books. A bank that has bought protection to cover its corporate bond exposure thinks it is hedged and therefore does not write off paper losses it may incur on those bond holdings. If the party who sold the insurance cannot pay on its claim in the event of a default, however, the bank’s losses would have to be reflected on its books.
Investors are already reeling from the recognition that major banks inaccurately estimated losses from the mortgage debacle. If further write-downs emerge as a result of hedges that did not work, investor confidence could take another dive.
To be sure, the $45 trillion in credit default swaps is not an exact reflection of what would be lost or won if all the underlying securities defaulted. That figure is impossible to pinpoint since the amounts that are recovered in default situations vary.
But one of the challenges facing participants in the credit default swap market is that the market value amount of the contracts outstanding far exceeds the $5.7 trillion of the corporate bonds whose defaults the swaps were created to protect against.
To the uninitiated trying to understand this complex market, its size might initially seem a comfort, as if there were far more insurance covering the bonds than could ever be needed. But because each contract must be settled between buyer and seller if a default occurs, this imbalance can present a problem.
Typically, settling the agreements has required the delivery of defaulted bonds if the insurance buyer wants to be fully covered. If the insurance contracts exceed the bonds that are available for delivery, problems arise.
For example, when Delphi, the auto parts maker, filed for bankruptcy in October 2005, the credit default swaps on the company’s debt exceeded the value of underlying bonds tenfold. Buyers of credit insurance scrambled to buy the bonds, driving up their price to around 70 cents on the dollar, a startlingly high value for defaulted debt.
Market participants worked out an auction system where settlements of Delphi contracts could be made even if the bonds could not be physically delivered. This arrangement was done at just over 36 cents on the dollar; so buyers of protection on Delphi who did not have the bonds received $366.25 for every $1,000 in coverage they had bought. Had they been valuing their Delphi insurance coverage at $1,000 per bond, they would have had to write off that position by $633.75 per $1,000 bond.
That is why the valuation of these contracts is of such concern to some participants.
As with other securities that trade privately and by appointment, assigning values to credit default swaps is highly subjective. So some on Wall Street wonder how much of the paper gains generated in these instruments by firms and hedge funds last year will turn out to be illusory when they try to cash them in.
“The insurance business is very difficult to quantify risk in,” said Mr. Farrell of Annaly Capital Management. “You have to really read the contract to make sure you are covered. That is going to be the test of the market this year. As defaults kick in and as these events unfold, you are going to find out who has managed this well.”
Published: February 11 2008 21:19 | Last updated: February 11 2008 21:19
Another day, another loser in the global game of subprime hide and seek. As the Group of Seven finance leaders said over the weekend, there could be $400bn of losses in the financial system linked to US subprime mortgages.
Yet only $120bn have been revealed so far. American International Group’s confession on Monday reveals where some more of the losses were hiding.In December, the US insurer announced a $1.05bn to $1.15bn charge for October and November for credit default swap (CDS) insurance it wrote against collateralised debt obligations backed by subprime mortgages.
Now, alongside PwC’s conclusion that AIG had a “material weakness” in its reporting, that charge has been increased to $4.9bn. That is largely the result of a change in methodology. Last time AIG did not mark its exposure to where the cash bonds were trading – instead it made an adjustment for where it believed the CDS should trade. Now, it has effectively acknowledged there is not good enough market data on the CDS, so it has reverted to pricing off the cash bonds.
That is the good news. The latest valuation should provide a better basis for worst case scenarios.
The trouble is, the AIG numbers are only marked as at November 30. Its $63bn of exposure to subprime CDOs is likely to have taken a further hit since then. And the latest revelation will surely make investors more concerned about how much of the missing $280bn of estimated system-wide losses are lurking on insurance companies’ balance sheets.
There will come a point when the downwards spiral of mark-to market losses stop, and, in some cases, are reversed into gains. But, given the deleveraging taking place in the financial sector and continuing house price misery, that moment is still some way away.
Auditors have been trying to encourage a common approach to valuation, amid predictions that this will shed new and harsh light on the full scale of the financial damage caused by the subprime crisis.
AIG produced the revised figures after PwC, its auditors, concluded that there was a “material weakness” in the way the insurer valued its exposure.
AIG told investors in December that it estimated valuation losses on its credit default swaps for October and November at just over $1bn. But that was after an “adjustment” based on the assumption that the risk of default implied by CDO bond prices was higher than should be reflected in the value of the insurance. This adjustment was $3.64bn in November alone.
AIG has scrapped the adjustment because market conditions mean it cannot “reliably quantify” the figure.
AIG puts two-month subprime loss at $5bn
By David Wighton, Aline van Duyn and Stacy-Marie Ishmael in New York
Published: February 11 2008 16:18 | Last updated: February 11 2008 23:55
American International Group sent tremors through the markets on Monday when the insurance company raised its estimate of losses in October and November from insuring mortgage-related instruments from about $1bn to nearly $5bn.
The announcement came as a number of companies are preparing to release audited accounts for 2007. Auditors have been trying to encourage a common approach to valuation, amid predictions that this will shed new and harsh light on the full scale of the financial damage caused by the subprime crisis.
AIG produced the revised figures after PwC, its auditors, concluded that there was a “material weakness” in the way the insurer valued its exposure. The world’s biggest insurance company by assets saw its shares tumble 11 per cent, wiping $14bn off its market value.
Measures of credit risk in both the US and Europe reached new record levels indicating widespread investor risk aversion. This followed persistent pressure on markets last week amid fears about corporate and commercial property debt defaults.
Shares in European insurance companies fell heavily on the news, although observers said most did not have such exposure to US credit markets and used different accounting policies.
AIG’s move came after Peer Steinbrück, Germany’s finance minister, warned at the weekend that losses on securities linked to US subprime mortgages could reach $400bn. Some of those losses will be borne by companies such as AIG which have provided insurance for investors in collateralised debt obligations, complex instruments composed of mortgage-backed bonds.
AIG has written $78bn of credit default swaps on CDOs, which protect the purchaser from a CDO’s failure to pay.
The primary providers of the hedges are bond insurers such as MBIA and Ambac, whose ability to pay claims is causing growing concern in global markets. These have written about $125bn of protection on “senior tranches” of CDOs, according to data from Standard & Poor’s.
AIG told investors in December that it estimated valuation losses on its credit default swaps for October and November at just over $1bn. But that was after an “adjustment” based on the assumption that the risk of default implied by CDO bond prices was higher than should be reflected in the value of the insurance. This adjustment was $3.64bn in November alone.
AIG has scrapped the adjustment because market conditions mean it cannot “reliably quantify” the figure.
Catherine Seifert, analyst at S&P, said the news was “troubling” and AIG would “have an extremely difficult time regaining investor confidence”.
MBI / ABK / XL-CapAss / MBI-InsCorp - Bond insurers rallied yesterday after MBIA successfully raised $1 billion in equity. The offering was increased from the initial amount of $750 million, with JP Morgan and Lehman Brothers underwriting the plan and private equity firm Warburg Pincus providing a backstop. The new capital will bolster MBIA’s balance sheet and help the operating entity maintain its precious AAA rating. Whether it will be enough to prevent the rating agencies from pulling the trigger remains to be seen. XL Capital Assurance, a smaller rival of MBIA, yesterday saw its AAA financial strength rating downgraded six notches to A3 by Moody’s. XL will now find it difficult to attract new business. Deutsche Bank CEO Josef Ackermann yesterday issued a stark warning about the effects of such negative ratings actions. Ackermann said downgrades on monolines could trigger a “tsunami-like event comparable to sub-prime” as banks take writedowns on their exposure to the sector. Financial spreads will remain volatile until the issue is resolved.