Archive for the ‘Regulation - Pensions’ Category

MiFID: Markets in Financial Instruments Directive

Friday, May 4th, 2007
Company information

  Equiduct is a pan-European venture created to address the sweeping changes being introduced by the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) with respect to European equities impacting all European investment firms from November 2007.Equiduct will offer a range of services to enable financial institutions to meet their statutory commitments to provide Best Execution and Transparency to their clients in a cost effective, integrated Europe wide single connection for trading services and execution.

Equiduct’s pan-European market data services will provide for a virtual consolidated tape which will be the reference of choice for cross-border trading.

Equiduct Regulated Market Model

Hybrid Book
Hybrid central limit order book in which orders from Participants compete seamlessly alongside firm, executable, continuous, two sided quotes for equities, with automatic quote refresh, posted by Market Makers registered in those stocks.

PartnerExSM
Offers professional investors the best price, very low cost, high speed and greatest likelihood of execution thereby allowing for all forms of weightings to be applied to these factors whilst still allowing the use of Equiduct so as to give the Best Execution result.

Market Data
Equiduct will produce a real-time feed for liquid instruments and distribute the available aggregated Best Bid and Offer prices across all relevant execution venues in Europe. In addition, Equiduct will distribute pre- and post-trade information relating to its PartnerEx and Hybrid book transactions.

http://www.finextra.com/fullsolns.asp?id=2993 

UK Pensions Act 2004

Sunday, April 29th, 2007

 http://www.watsonwyatt.com/europe/services/integrated/pension_framework/PlanDesign.asp

Plan design

The Finance Act 2004 and Pensions Act 2004 introduce a radically different regime for the provision of tax-favoured pensions. What does this mean for employers and for trustees of occupational pension schemes: what is the minimum approach; what new options do the changes provide; what longer-term possibilities might there be?

The new tax regime comes into effect from 6 April 2006. This does not leave very much time to decide on what to do. There are many issues that must be addressed. High earners have a totally new set of rules to plan for, and for all other employees a wealth of opportunities are opened up for efficient pension provision.

This section sets out our understanding of the provisions of the Finance Act and some of the Pensions Act to help employers and trustees consider the issues. The summaries provided cannot contain all the detail, and it is therefore recommended that you take specific legal and actuarial advice.

The different sections included are:

AVCs

This document sets out plan design implications of the new pensions framework on AVCs.
Read the full fact sheet
Version: 3
Date: May 2006

DC design issues

This document sets out plan design implications of the new pensions framework on DC design issues.
Read the full fact sheet
Version: 4
Date: May 2006

Death benefits

This document sets out plan design implications of the new pensions framework on death benefits.
Read the full fact sheet
Version: 4
Date: May 2006

The Earnings Cap/Revenue limits

This document highlights some of the issues for plan design following the removal of the Earnings Cap and other Inland Revenue limits under the new pensions framework.
Read the full fact sheet
Version: 4
Date: May 2006

Equal treatment

In this time of changing pensions legislation, several other issues, that schemes will need to consider, are waiting in the wings. These relate to the equal treatment of employees and have pension scheme ramifications.

The Civil Partnership Act 2004 will require schemes to align the provision of death benefits to a registered same-sex partner with those for a surviving spouse. The Government also has to implement legislation to combat age discrimination by 1 October 2006, although exactly what this will mean for schemes remains to be seen. Thereafter, measures, arising from the European Commission, raise the prospect of schemes having to use ‘unisex’ annuity rates and the treatment of workers employed through an ‘agency’ on a basis no less favourable than that applying to other employees.
Read the full fact sheet
Version: 4
Date: May 2006

Flexible retirement

This document sets out plan design implications of the new pensions framework on flexible retirement.
Read the full fact sheet
Version: 4
Date: May 2006

International implications

This document sets out the implications of the new pensions framework in relation to international employees.
Read the full fact sheet
Version: 4
Date: May 2006

LTA issues

This document sets out plan design implications of the new pensions framework on LTA issues.
Read the full fact sheet
Version: 3
Date: May 2006

Other legislation

Besides the Pensions Act 2004 and the Finance Act 2004, pension plan design will be affected by other legislation. This document highlights some of these implications.
Read the full fact sheet
Version: 4
Date: May 2006

Tax-free lump sums on retirement

This document sets out plan design implications of the new pensions framework on tax-free lump sums on retirement.
Read the full fact sheet
Version: 5
Date: May 2006

This note gives a broad outline of the provisions. Action should not be taken on the basis of the information provided without seeking specific advice. Please note that some provisions may be amended in the Finance Act 2005.

Authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority.

Watson Wyatt: PPA 2006 Comments

Sunday, April 29th, 2007

 http://www.watsonwyatt.com/us/topics/htrender.asp?ID=14948

The Pension Protection Act of 2006 is the most significant overhaul of U.S. pension laws since the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) was enacted in 1974.

Passed by Congress and signed by President Bush in August 2006, the Pension Protection Act (PPA) rewrites almost all major aspects of pension law, requiring defined benefit and defined contribution plan sponsors to make a number of changes. The bill’s most significant changes include:

  • Establishing new funding targets for single-employer pension plans
  • Imposing higher funding targets on at-risk plans
  • Replacing the old discount rate with a modified yield curve of corporate bond rates
  • Eliminating the full-funding limit for variable rate premiums
  • Adding new requirements for multiemployer plans
  • Clarifying hybrid pension plan rules
  • Establishing new rules for 401(k)s and other defined contribution plans

Federal agencies are expected to issue regulations through 2008 that detail how employers must implement the act.

More

Related News

CBO 2005: Estimating the Costs of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation

Sunday, April 29th, 2007

CBO
Testimony

Statement of
Douglas Holtz-Eakin
Director

Estimating the Costs of the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation

before the
Committee on the Budget
U.S. House of Representatives

June 9, 2005

This statement is embargoed until 9:30 a.m. (EDT) on Thursday, June 9, 2005. The contents may not be published, transmitted, or otherwise communicated by any print, broadcast, or electronic media before that time.

Chairman Nussle, Mr. Spratt, and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to discuss the ongoing work that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is doing at the request of this Committee on budgeting for loans, guarantees, and insurance. Today, I will focus on the economic costs, federal costs, and budgetary treatment of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s (PBGC’s) insurance of defined-benefit pension plans.

At the outset of my statement, however, I would emphasize two important caveats. First, CBO’s efforts to estimate the costs of PBGC and to identify alternative, potentially more effective budgetary treatments constitute a work in progress. With further refinements, CBO’s estimates and findings are likely to change somewhat. Second, the estimates that I will be reporting today are market measures of the value of financial resources being transferred to or within the defined-benefit pension system under current law. They are not budget cost estimates, nor do the estimates of the effects of changes in policy represent the budget scoring for legislation that would effect those changes.

As economic–rather than budget cost–measures, the estimates provide an opportunity to think broadly about federal policy toward defined-benefit pension plans. Under current policy, the full cost of those pensions is not being shouldered by the plans’ sponsors. Rather, because the current rules permit plans to be underfunded and because pension insurance is underpriced for many plans, some of the costs are being borne by the plans’ beneficiaries and, potentially, by taxpayers. From a budgetary perspective, the key question is, how much should taxpayers be required to contribute to the defined-benefit pension system?

Under current law, PBGC is liable for insured benefits only to the extent that it has resources from insurance premiums, investment income, the assets of terminated plans, and recoveries from sponsors. However, because PBGC is a federal insurance agency, there is a widespread belief that its obligations have at least an implied federal guarantee that commits the government to use general revenues to honor insured claims.

In pursuing the objective of reducing or eliminating federal costs, policymakers have several general types of approaches available. One group consists largely of regulatory instruments, including raising premiums and adjusting them for risk, tightening the pension funding rules, improving the measurement and reporting of pension liabilities, and attempting to increase the discipline of private sponsors’ funding decisions. Higher premiums–in particular, ones linked to PBGC’s risk exposure–would offset losses on future claims. More accurate measurement of plans’ liabilities would make the existing funding rules and premium schedule more effective.

If beneficiaries understood that they were at risk from plans’ underfunding, they would have incentives to press for higher funding or perhaps another form of compensation. Accordingly, increased requirements for plans to publicly and frequently disclose sufficient information about their financial condition could be useful in reducing federal costs. Alternatively, privatizing PBGC so that losses were absorbed by its shareholders or by private reinsurers would also bring the force of market discipline to the task of controlling PBGC’s losses.

Policymakers could also use budget instruments to help move toward eliminating federal costs for PBGC. Increasing the transparency of PBGC’s own financial condition and performance could be as useful as doing so for the pension plans. For instance, the agency’s budget accounts could be reconfigured to recognize the accruing cost to the government from pension insurance.

The Congress may also decide that, for various reasons, subsidizing the defined-benefit pension system is desirable. In that case, policymakers may be willing to accept some level of expected funding through general revenues. The same policy instruments could be used to limit taxpayers’ exposure as would be used to eliminate it.

The economic costs of PBGC insurance to taxpayers (if the implicit guarantee is honored) are substantial. In thinking about reducing those costs, however, it is critical to distinguish between costs already incurred and prospective costs. PBGC had accumulated losses of $23.3 billion at fiscal year-end 2004 for single-employer plans that had been terminated or whose termination the agency regarded as probable. “Sunk” costs for plans that have been terminated (in actuality or in effect) cannot be avoided, and policy decisions can determine only who will bear those costs. However, policy changes can reduce prospective costs.

CBO estimates that the economic costs to the public of PBGC insurance for single-employer plans net of premium collections over the next 10 years is $48 billion. That figure describes the estimated net present value of the financial resources that the program will be transferring to sponsors of and participants in defined-benefit pensions. It is also the price that the government would have to pay to private insurers bidding in competitive markets to take on the obligations that PBGC will assume in that period with current premiums and funding rules. Adding sunk costs and prospective costs together results in a total of $71 billion for the upcoming decade, $83 billion for 15 years, and $91 billion for 20 years.

In terms of the particular instruments that could be used, CBO’s calculations suggest the following:

  • Premium collections would have to rise fivefold in order to cut net federal costs to zero through increases in premiums alone. For well-funded plans, which do not pay a premium for underfunding, the increase would be relatively modest, but for severely underfunded plans, which do pay an underfunding premium ($9 per $1,000 of underfunding per year), the increase could constitute a large increase in costs.
  • Some proposals that the Administration has made, if enacted, could measurably reduce the economic costs of the system. For example, increasing premiums from $19 to $30 per participant would reduce 10-year net economic costs by $3 billion, while the proposed tighter rules for calculating pension liabilities and the proposed requirements for increased funding by financially distressed sponsors could reduce prospective economic costs significantly.
  • Other policy changes such as reducing the maximum share of a pension plan’s assets that could be invested in equities (stocks) to 30 percent from the current unregulated level of about 70 percent would reduce costs by $7 billion over 10 years.
  • Some changes currently being considered could increase prospective costs. For example, making permanent a legislated increase in the discount rate used to calculate the present value of pension liabilities would increase PBGC’s net costs by $5.3 billion. Increasing the average time permitted for closing a plan’s funding gap by two years would raise net costs by $6 billion.
  • Changing the budgetary treatment of PBGC or changing its ownership by paying a private entity to take it over would not directly affect net costs but could increase the visibility of those costs and contribute to improved monitoring by the Congress.

Estimating the Costs of PBGC

The recent takeover of several airlines’ pension plans by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation has focused attention on and raised concerns about this program’s costs to the government, taxpayers, the plans’ sponsors, and the plans’ participants. However, the budgetary and financial information currently available about PBGC is not very informative about the likely costs of the takeovers or the incidence of those costs.

One reason for the absence of such information is that federal pension insurance gives a large number of beneficiaries valuable but highly uncertain claims to future payments. A natural approach to determining the costs of such claims is to find market prices for equivalent uncertain commitments. Although no exact match is currently available in private markets, finance specialists have developed techniques for using the prices of securities that are bought and sold to price contracts that are not traded. In the case of PBGC, the value of defined-benefit pension insurance is equivalent to a type of put option. Specifically, the option held by a pension plan’s beneficiaries is to sell, or put, the assets of the plan to PBGC at a price equal to the value of the insured liabilities, contingent on the financial distress of the sponsor.

CBO has used those techniques along with publicly available information to project the three key determinants of PBGC’s costs: the probability of a sponsor’s bankruptcy, which is necessary before the put can be exercised; the probability distribution of the plan’s underfunding (the plan’s liabilities minus its assets) at termination, which is the value of the put option when it is exercised (or when the plan is transferred to PBGC); and market risk (the correlation of PBGC’s claims with bad economic conditions), which affects the discount rate used to calculate the present value of the option.

The resulting estimated costs are the market value of the financial resources transferred to the defined-benefit pension system by PBGC. The estimates are based on information contained in Securities and Exchange Commission filings by publicly traded sponsors of defined-benefit pension plans. (Data on privately held companies and confidential filings that sponsors of publicly traded companies with significantly underfunded plans submit to PBGC are not available to CBO.) In the data available to CBO, plans’ total liabilities amount to about 88 percent of those reported by PBGC. Therefore, CBO has scaled its estimates of PBGC’s costs by a factor of 1.14 to adjust them to the size of the defined-benefit pension system.

The estimates are subject to considerable uncertainty for many reasons. CBO’s estimates rely on firms’ reports that are based on generally accepted accounting principles of pension assets and liabilities, whereas PBGC’s figures rely on firms’ reports for the Internal Revenue Service and under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, which indicate a higher initial level of underfunding. Also, CBO’s estimates are based on assumptions that simplify the complexities of the defined-benefit pension system. For example, all plans are assumed to fund pensions with the same mix of assets and to exhibit the same jump in liabilities at termination.

Using those assumptions, CBO estimates that under current policy, the market price of PBGC insurance going forward for existing plans for 10 years is $48 billion (net of premiums and assets of terminated plans and recoveries). That figure conveys the present value of the commitment to take on PBGC’s net obligations for existing single-employer plans for the next 10 years. With the $23.3 billion in accumulated losses reported by PBGC at year-end 2004, the combined total of historical and prospective 10-year costs is about $71 billion.

The $23.3 billion in accumulated losses are sunk costs that cannot be avoided by policy changes now and that will be difficult to recover from surviving sponsors. As a consequence, policymakers have greater latitude in focusing on the second component of costs: claims that are prospective under current policy and, therefore, may be avoided.

Measures to Reduce the Federal Costs of PBGC

Two general regulatory approaches may be useful in reducing the future net costs of PBGC insurance. The first is to raise insurance premiums and adjust them for risk. The second is to reduce the level of risk in the defined-benefit pension system.

Raising Premiums

Raising premiums would require sponsors to pay a larger share of costs. To cut federal costs to zero through higher premiums alone would require a fivefold increase in PBGC’s receipts from premiums. Those higher premiums might be manageable for well-funded plans, which currently pay only a flat charge of $19 per year per participant for insurance. However, for firms with plans that are significantly underfunded, their current annual premiums also include a charge of $9 per $1,000 of underfunding. A hypothetical firm with 1,000 participants and $50 million in underfunding would pay premiums of $469,000 per year, of which $450,000 is the charge for underfunding. Therefore, for some firms, the increase in premiums could be significant–perhaps to the point of causing them to adjust the form and level of compensation that they offer.

Reducing or Charging for Risk

An alternative to a proportionate increase in premiums for all sponsors would be to make premiums more sensitive to the risk that various plans pose for PBGC. Although the extra charge for underfunding currently provides some adjustment based on risk, increasing the variation in premiums on the basis of risk could reduce the current cross-subsidies from low-risk sponsors and plans to high-risk ones. Some risk-adjusted premiums could also strengthen incentives for sponsors to reduce risk–which could lower the premium rate required to achieve any given level of net costs.

With this approach, premiums would be higher for sponsors that were more likely to encounter financial distress and whose plans would tend to be more deeply underfunded at termination. For example, premiums could vary with the volatility of the market value of a firm and its pension assets, the ratio of the firm’s liabilities to its equity (leverage), and the firm’s credit rating. The resulting range of premiums could be substantially wider than it is under current policy because risk varies significantly among plans. If, for example, premiums were set so that PBGC’s expected net cost for insuring an investment-grade company (which is within the top four broad ratings categories) was the same as that for a lower-rated company, they would need to be about 20 times higher per dollar of liability for the lower-rated company.

Another important correlate of plans’ risk that could provide a basis for adjusting premiums is the ratio of a pension plan’s assets in equities to its total assets. Sponsors appear to prefer a high proportion of equities because they expect higher average returns on stocks than on bonds. If realized, that risk premium would reduce the cash contributions a sponsor must make to its plan in order to fund the promised pension benefits. Of course, such investments entail the risk that the stock market will do poorly and the plan will become underfunded.

Plans with a high proportion of common stocks, rather than high-quality bonds or other fixed-income securities, exhibit more volatility in the value of their assets than do plans holding more debt securities. Plans with a high share of stocks are thus at greater risk of underfunding when the sponsors encounter financial distress. That increase in risk to PBGC means that fair (full-cost) premiums would be about 16 percent lower for plans with an equity share of 30 percent rather than the average of almost 70 percent currently found in defined-benefit pension plans. Such an adjustment in premiums could create incentives for firms’ investment decisions that could lower costs and improve the match between the risk posed and the premiums paid. An alternative to relying on the incentive effects of risk-based premiums to reduce risk would be to limit, through law or regulation, the share of assets that plans could invest in stocks.

The current structure of premiums tends to disconnect them from risk because PBGC’s costs vary more closely with plans’ liabilities rather than their number of participants. The per-participant charge also tends to lower the premium per dollar of insured liabilities for firms with a high proportion of older or high-wage employees compared with firms whose workforce is predominantly younger or lower paid and therefore has few accumulated pension benefits. At the current rate of $19 per participant, those effects may be small, but if rates were raised to be fair on average, the effects on firms’ behavior could be significant.

A major source of risk to PBGC is the potentially large gap between the level of pension liabilities reported under the current definitions and funding rules and the economic value of those liabilities at plans’ termination. PBGC often reports that plans that appeared to be well-funded prior to termination turn out to be deeply underfunded when they are transferred to the agency. For example, Bethlehem Steel’s plan was 84 percent funded on the basis of current reporting requirements but was only 45 percent funded at termination.(1) Underfunding can increase as a sponsor approaches bankruptcy for several reasons, including the discretion that the law allows in calculating the present value of a plan’s liabilities and in valuing assets at their purchase price rather than current market value. (Those same funding rules also permit many plans that are effectively underfunded to avoid paying the variable-rate premium of $9 per $1,000 of underfunding.) Changing the definition and measurement of liabilities and tightening the funding rules, especially for sponsors with a greater chance of financial distress, could lessen the risk to PBGC and to the defined-benefit pension system.

Increasing the Visibility of PBGC’s Costs

The policy changes needed to reduce the costs of pension insurance might be facilitated by increasing the visibility of PBGC’s costs through changes in the budgetary treatment of pension insurance or other means. The present budgetary treatment focuses on the cash inflows to PBGC’s on-budget account, primarily from premiums, interest income, and transfers from an off-budget trust fund, which holds the assets of plans taken over by PBGC. The inflows are netted against federal outlays for pension benefits in plans run by PBGC’s trustees and for administrative expenses. That treatment delays the recognition of insurance claims, often for decades, from when they are realized at a plan’s termination to when benefits are paid. As a consequence, and despite large losses, PBGC’s budgetary position has contributed to reducing the federal deficit in every year except for fiscal year 2003, when the on-budget account recorded net outlays of $229 million. For fiscal year 2004, net budget outlays for PBGC were once again negative, representing a net cash inflow of $247 million. Such budgetary treatment is not designed to indicate or suited to describing the expected risk and magnitude of losses in the pension insurance system.

The financial statements issued by PBGC include losses on plans that have been terminated and those whose takeover the agency can foresee. In addition, PBGC publishes financial projections based on its Pension Insurance Modeling System, which indicate that the midpoint of the agency’s distribution of accumulated deficits in 10 years is about $30 billion. Although both of those indicators of PBGC’s financial status provide useful information to policymakers and are good starting points for further analysis, the first focuses primarily on losses that have occurred, including losses on probable terminations (the $23.3 billion cited earlier); and the latter excludes the cost of market risk.

Information on the present market value of future transfers to the defined-benefit pension system net of future premiums might be provided to the Congress through a supplementary reporting system or through changes in budget presentation. The first approach would offer the advantage of avoiding the need for changes to the budget, which are difficult to make piecemeal; the second, the advantage of citing budget numbers, which are more frequently used for policy decisions than supplementary information is.

Budgetary treatments of pension insurance that would better indicate full costs should be the following:

  • Timely. According to a recommendation of the President’s Commission on Budget Concepts, the budget should reflect outlays when the government incurs the obligation to pay.(2) In the case of PBGC, that point suggests that costs should include losses on pension plans when they are terminated.
  • Based on Market Value. In general, the budget uses market prices to measure the value of inputs consumed by various federal programs. For consistency, market prices should be used in estimating insurance costs. For PBGC, the market price of risk is significant because the events that precipitate a transfer of pension liabilities to PBGC, including low investment returns, high rates of financial distress, and low interest rates, occur when the market value of all assets is down.
  • Prospective. The costs relevant to budgeting are those to which the government is committing in the budget period. Although sunk costs need to be recorded and paid, it is those costs that are being incurred in the budget period that are the focus of decisions. Of course, the extent to which the government is committing to pay under current law is restricted to the resources available to PBGC from premiums, assets of terminated plans, and recoveries from sponsors.

The current budgetary treatment of PBGC recognizes the inflow of premium collections during the budget period but not the value of claims arising under the insurance. It thus falls short of having the attributes outlined above. CBO is currently exploring budgetary alternatives that might attain those qualities. One possibility would be to estimate the net prospective economic costs of PBGC over a specified period and to treat those values as the budget baseline costs of the program. Future year budgets could recognize the changes in the value of the insurance due to changes in law, regulation, or variables such as insured liabilities or interest rates. In the language of credit reform, those changes in costs might be treated either as reestimates (the result of unexpected economic changes) or modifications (the result of policy changes).

Another possibility would be to structure the accounts to recognize as budget costs the unpaid fair-value premiums for PBGC insurance. That is, estimates of the annual premiums required to cut the net budget costs of insurance to zero could be compared with the premiums expected to be paid by sponsors, and the difference could be shown as the budget costs of PBGC.

A more extreme approach would be to transfer PBGC to private owners. That step would probably accelerate the recognition of past losses in the budget because the current deficit would have to be covered, presumably by Congressional appropriations, before a private entity would be willing to assume the program’s obligations. In addition, a private owner might require either an annual or lump-sum payment from the government to continue to operate the insurance program under current funding rules and premiums. Because PBGC insurance is mandatory for defined-benefit pension plans, the government would probably remain involved in regulating the terms of the insurance–which raises the question of the amount of risk and responsibility the government effectively could transfer to private owners. Nevertheless, the risk to the government would most likely be less than it is under current policy.

The Administration’s Proposals

The Bush Administration has proposed several changes in the defined-benefit pension system intended to reduce its financial shortfall and increase transparency.(3) Generally, the Administration would raise premiums and permit further risk-adjustment of them; change the measure of plans’ liabilities and funding requirements; and increase public disclosures of plans’ funding status. Plans’ sponsors would also be permitted to fund the liabilities at higher levels during good economic conditions (without loss of tax benefits) as a buffer against underfunding during bad economic conditions and to use a higher discount rate to calculate plans’ liabilities. Most of those changes are consistent with the objective of reducing the federal costs of pension insurance. More specifically, the major provisions being proposed would do the following:

  • Raise the fixed premium per participant from $19 to $30 per year and index the premium to future wage growth. CBO estimates that this change would reduce the prospective 10-year economic costs of PBGC insurance by $3 billion.(4)
  • Authorize PBGC’s directors (the Secretaries of Labor, Treasury, and Commerce) to adjust the variable-rate portion of the premium so that PBGC’s income would cover expected losses. The change would require more than a sixfold increase in the premiums paid by plans’ sponsors.
  • Require that plans’ liabilities reflect the effects of early retirements, lump-sum distributions, and increased longevity. The proposal would also require sponsors with credit ratings below investment-grade to calculate pension liabilities by assuming that employees retire at the earliest opportunity, thereby increasing estimated liabilities. Such sponsors would also be required to fund completely any increases in the plans’ benefits. Although it is difficult to estimate the effect of the tighter rules for calculating liabilities, they are potentially the largest source of savings among the Administration’s proposals.
  • For the purpose of discounting in calculating pension liabilities, funding requirements, and premiums, mandate the use of a three-month average of interest rates on corporate bonds whose duration matches the scheduled payments to beneficiaries. The proposal would make permanent the change from a Treasury rate to a corporate rate for discounting pension liabilities. It would permit plans’ sponsors to avoid making up the additional underfunding that resulted from the legislated increase in discount rates for 2004 and 2005. According to CBO’s estimates, this proposal would increase PBGC’s costs by $5 billion over 10 years.

The Administration’s proposals incorporate many of the policy options discussed here to reduce PBGC’s risk exposure and to improve the transparency of the system. However, they also omit several options that are relatively important for reducing risk exposure and cross-subsidies between sponsors. First, premiums would continue to be unrelated to the risk of how pension assets are invested. Second, no new limitations would be placed on sponsors’ investment policies. Third, the proposals retain a fixed charge per worker, rather than establishing charges per dollar of coverage, which would perpetuate a transfer from plans with younger, lower-paid workers to those with a higher proportion of older workers, higher-paid workers, and retirees.


1.  Statement of Bradley D. Belt, Executive Director, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, before the Senate Committee on Finance, March 1, 2005.

PBGC’s future liabilities

Sunday, April 29th, 2007

Uncle Sam: Up To His Neck In The Risk Pool
The government is the insurer-of-last-resort for a mind-boggling array of catastrophes

Few people pay much attention to such arcane issues as government pension guarantees. But when bankrupt UAL Corp.’s (UALQ ) United Airlines Inc. recently dumped $6.6 billion in unfunded pension liabilities on the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (PBGC), the obscure federal agency was suddenly front-page news. The reason for all the interest: United’s move comes on top of a wave of recent corporate bankruptcies that has left the PBGC $23 billion short of what it needs to cover failed pensions. This raises the unsettling prospect of taxpayers getting stuck with a savings-and-loan-type bailout of the agency, which backstops traditional pension plans for 44 million workers and retirees who would otherwise take a bigger hit.


It turns out that the PBGC is just one pool in a vast sea of risks that Washington bears. Over the years, Congress has created one program after another to insure individuals and businesses against a panoply of hazards, from natural disasters to bank failures to nuclear reactor meltdowns. Surprisingly, the federal government doesn’t tote up the potential price of all these promises. But collectively they add up to an astounding $6 trillion-plus in possible claims, according to the Center on Federal Financial Institutions (COFFI), a Washington think tank. Says Kenneth A. Froot, a Harvard Business School business administration professor: “The federal government has assumed risks all over the map, and I don’t think anybody has good numbers on the exposure.”

No one is suggesting an Armageddon scenario in which all these trillions come due at once. But policymakers’ failure to get a grip on the mountain of insurance they’re piling up could be costly, since it’s widely assumed that taxpayers would have to bail out a government insurer that gets swamped with claims. In addition, it’s far from certain that Congress is socking away enough money to cover payouts that could be owed under more likely outcomes. For public policy reasons or because the risks are hard to predict, some federal insurance systems don’t pay their own way. For example, the government charges insurers nothing at all for reinsurance against another major terrorist attack like September 11.

Federal budgeting math exacerbates the problem, since it often masks the true cost of insurance to taxpayers. The national budget shows annual cash flows from premiums and payouts on claims, with no money set aside for future liabilities. That makes it difficult to see the total long-term obligations Congress has assumed. “The government often gives away free or cheap insurance and acts as if there is no cost until we cut the check,” says COFFI President Douglas J. Elliott.

The PBGC is the most glaring example of this buy-now, pay-later approach. Even today, the agency actually looks like a profit center in the federal budget. Because the premiums employers pay to the PBGC — plus its investment income — exceed its payouts to cover failed pensions, the agency shows up as having contributed a total of $12 billion to federal coffers since 1982. In recent years, though, its long-term pension liabilities have soared with all the corporate bankruptcies. Some analysts even believe the long-term deficit is much larger than the PBGC’s own $23 billion appraisal. Using a broader pricing methodology, congressional number-crunchers figure the agency faces a shortfall of more than $120 billion over the next decade.

MURKY TOTALS
A lot of the problem stems from the lack of budget clarity. Because Washington doesn’t have to put money aside for the PBGC’s future liabilities, it’s all too easy for Congress to expand its insurance commitments. That’s what happened last year when airlines and steel producers got a big break on pension fund contributions, increasing the cost to the PBGC if it eventually has to take over any of those companies’ plans. Now, Congress is mulling tighter pension-funding rules and higher premiums, but lawmakers might have acted sooner if the budget had reflected economic reality. “When [lawmakers] are asked to make decisions about additional insurance, they’re not told what they may be putting the government on the hook for in the future,” says Susan J. Irving, director of federal budget analysis at the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

Congress, in 1990, did shift to a more transparent budgeting method for most federal loan programs, such as those for housing and to students. But attempts to use a pay-as-you-go system for federal insurance fizzled because some risks are tough to calculate and because it would draw attention to programs’ potential high costs.

The real question is whether Congress should put aside funds to cover all the various insurance risks. Take terrorism. In 2002, Congress required insurance companies to resume offering terrorism coverage to companies, a business many had pulled out of after the 2001 terrorist attacks. In return, lawmakers pledged to bear the cost of most large claims, up to $100 billion. The program expires at the end of the year, so Congress now is considering whether and how to renew it. Many economists think it should require insurers to pay annual premiums, just as employers do with the PBGC. Not charging premiums “is like me not paying State Farm for auto insurance because I don’t have any claims yet,” says J. Robert Hunter, director of insurance at the Consumer Federation of America.

Even if that happens, taxpayers could still face a huge liability. After all, insured losses caused by the September 11 attacks totaled some $32 billion, about a third of which Uncle Sam stepped in to pay. While it would be difficult to calculate how much money Congress should budget each year to cover all the potential losses in a future attack, it’s not impossible, experts say. Models developed by Insurance Services Office Inc., a purveyor of risk products and services, show Washington should be setting aside about $1.4 billion a year, Hunter says.

Lawmakers also are weighing changes in coverage and funding rules for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC), which insures bank deposits up to $100,000. It’s funded by premiums banks pay on the deposits they hold. But some industry critics argue that Congress set the premiums too low. Most banks have paid nothing at all to the FDIC since 1997, because the $47 billion in reserves it has built up exceed the legally required ratio. What would happen, though, if the current housing bubble burst? Bank failures could quickly deplete the reserves, predicts George G. Pennacchi, a finance professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. If that occurred, banks would be required to kick in more, right when they’re racking up losses. “And you can be sure the healthy banks would say: ‘We shouldn’t be penalized for the failures of our poorly run brethren,”‘ says Pennacchi.

Understandably, Congress shrinks from raising costs, either as premiums to employers or as another item in Uncle Sam’s budget. But it may need to reconsider as the true burden of federal insurance promises comes to light.


JUNE 6, 2005

http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_23/b3936100_mz021.htm

% PBGC and Risk Management

Sunday, April 29th, 2007

PDF]

PBGC - Risk Management and Early Warning / Legal Management

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat
upgrading PBGC’s security program to include Risk Management and Legal Matter Management project manager will work within the allocated budget
www.dol.gov/dol/budget/2008/PDF/E300-2008-038.pdf

June Mulroy: UK Pensions Regulator on DB schemes’ risk-sharing approach

Sunday, April 29th, 2007

DB schemes move towards risk-sharing approach

Thursday 26th April 2007: 10:00

By Nyree Stewart

At least one large company with a defined benefit scheme is considering reopening the pension but on a risk-sharing basis, claims the Pensions Regulator.

Speaking at the launch of its governance discussion paper, June Mulroy, executive director of delivery at the Pensions Regulator, suggested there are some interesting products coming through the market aimed at large final salary FTSE 100 companies, but the problem to address is how to offer less expensive ‘scaled down’ versions.

She says it is ‘heartening’ many employers want to keep their DB schemes open, although not necessarily on the same terms, so has been keeping a watching brief at solutions emerging from the City.

Mulroy adds: “We know of one company considering reopening its DB scheme as a risk-sharing proposition, as they feel they have a product which can manage these risks, and although at the early stage we were initially sceptical, it seems to have legs, and we can see other companies beginning to look at this approach.”

However, while some employers do approach the Regulator about proposed schemes, Mulroy says it doesn’t ‘approve’ or ‘kite mark’ schemes, although it does highlight which aspects it really doesn’t like.

She says: “There are some ideas we have seen which are simply abandonment – hence our guidance last year – however we are beginning to see less of these although the solutions currently available are focused on the large FTSE 100 companies, but they are more regulated.”

Mulroy says she doesn’t believe any solutions will really emerge until the end of 2007, as she says they would require “fundamental changes” which cannot “happen overnight” as firms have to find the funds to make any new solutions viable.

She also warns the Regulator does not want to become a ‘tick-box’ regulator as the aim is to get away from the compliance-based regime and move towards a more risk-based approach.

She points out the problems with a ‘tick-based’ approach is it could lead to a ‘one-size fits all’ approach of pension fund regulation, whereas the Pensions Regulator wants to ‘educate and enable’ rather than resort to enforcement.

She says, for example, in clearance procedures for mergers and acquisitions, firms do not actually need to apply for clearance or can ignore and recommendation TPR make, businesses might be risking the prospect of its powers being used at a later date.

She admits the Regulator does occasionally grant retrospective clearance on M&A issues, and although she says it “doesn’t like doing it” and believes it “isn’t the ideal”, she admits they will consider it to help provide a clearer picture for trustees.

Mulroy adds: “Enforcement is used as a last resort, we’re not afraid to use them, as we recently used one of our strongest powers [to ban a trustee for life], but it is an awfully large weapon to hit people with, particularly when it will only send a message to the people you hit.”

As a result, she says: “Education is our main issue as we don’t want to add to the burden of schemes. The Trustee Toolkit is the first step but we want to push it much more as there is a strong correlation between education and trustees understanding trickier issues such as employer covenants.”

If you have any comments you would like to add to this story or would like to speak to its author about a similar subject, telephone Nyree Stewart on 020 7034 2681 or email nyree.stewart@incisivemedia.com.

This article was first published by IFAonline, part of the Incisive Media group.

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